About the resupply missions in "The Martian".

[Kerbart]

Per distance unit traveled maybe. But 17 deaths out of 536 people is a deathrate per flight of about 3%. If I had a 3% chance of dieing every time I used my car, I would probably stop driving my car.

The number is slightly better. It’s 3% of the people who went into space died that you quote.

According to wikipedia there have been 301 manned spaceflights, and on 4 of those people died. Now, 2 of those were space shuttle flights with a full crew, which is why that 3% number is so high. When it comes to historical data, the chances of getting killed on a space flight are a “mere 1.3%â€Â

That is still a high number though. If the statistics on driving a car were that bad you'd get killed within a year.

[Nibb31]

So? Who says they need to dock? Just rendezvous, and EVA the crew from Shuttle A to B.

Did you even look at the STS-400 mission profile or the Ars Technica article I linked to? Let me link it again, because it's a really good read:

http://arstechnica.com/science/2014/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/

Also, I forgot to mention that Columbia wasn't equipped with any docking system at all. It only had an airlock.

- - - Updated - - -

The CO2 scrubbers were regenerative- you put them in a vacuum to suck the CO2 out. The problem is power. How much extra H2 O2 was there at Columbia EOM?

The CAIB doesn't agree with you, since the CO2 scrubber issue defined the deadline for sustaining life support on board Columbia in the event of this hypothetical rescue scenario.

Would it have been possible to shove an unmanned Soyuz onto a Ariane 4 AR 44L, or Ariane 5 G (both which have enough payload to launch it), then launch 3 of those in quick succession to save Columbia's crew?

Crew-rating of Ariane would not be needed, as the crew is only in the Soyuz for orbit and reeentry.

Are you joking? Do you have any idea what kind of effort is needed to design and build a spacecraft interface. You can't just stick a Soyuz on top of a rocket that it wasn't designed for, and expect everything to work, and certainly not in less than a month. It would take more than that just to ship a Soyuz out to Kourou.

Even if you could, what do you do once you get there? Soyuz can't do EVAs (the old models could initially, but that capability was removed), and it couldn't dock with the Shuttle. Even if Columbia had been fitted with its APAS docking system, Soyuz still couldn't dock because it uses the SSVP (probe and drogue) system instead of APAS.

No, a Soyuz rescue would have been impossible for so many reasons. The only other vehicle that was available for a rescue mission was another Shuttle, as described in the CAIB report.

Edited October 26, 2015 by Nibb31

[fredinno]

Did you even look at the STS-400 mission profile or the Ars Technica article I linked to? Let me link it again, because it's a really good read:

http://arstechnica.com/science/2014/02/the-audacious-rescue-plan-that-might-have-saved-space-shuttle-columbia/

Also, I forgot to mention that Columbia wasn't equipped with any docking system at all. It only had an airlock.

- - - Updated - - -

The CAIB doesn't agree with you, since the CO2 scrubber issue defined the deadline for sustaining life support on board Columbia in the event of this hypothetical rescue scenario.

Are you joking? Do you have any idea what kind of effort is needed to design and build a spacecraft interface. You can't just stick a Soyuz on top of a rocket that it wasn't designed for, and expect everything to work, and certainly not in less than a month. It would take more than that just to ship a Soyuz out to Kourou.

Even if you could, what do you do once you get there? Soyuz can't do EVAs (the old models could initially, but that capability was removed), and it couldn't dock with the Shuttle. Even if Columbia had been fitted with its APAS docking system, Soyuz still couldn't dock because it uses the SSVP (probe and drogue) system instead of APAS.

No, a Soyuz rescue would have been impossible for so many reasons. The only other vehicle that was available for a rescue mission was another Shuttle, as described in the CAIB report.

Ah, the scrubbers needed a .... ton of heat too to regenerate. Probably not good for the H2 O2 stores.

I was thinking of just using the Soyuz as a payload on the Ariane, covered by a payload fairing (like a comsat would), then having the Shuttle dock with it. Though the lack of EVA capability would doom such a mission anyways..

[sgt_flyer]

Ying i even wonder how much risky it would be to maintain stationkeeping with a remotely controlled soyuz next to the shuttle.

Afterall, soyuz systems need active docking antennas on the target for it's automatic approach systems to work. So remotely controlling a spacecraft with this degree of precision from the ground (accounting for variable latency etc as the signal would have to be relayed from different ground stations / relay satellites all around the world.)

The only time soyuz made a manual docking was with salyut 7

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soyuz_T-13

And they had to modify the soyuz to add manual controls so the soyuz pilot could make his own manual approach and docking. (The station lost power on february 11th 1985, the repair mission launched on june 6th 1985 - so they needed several month of time to do those modifications)

keep also in mind the added difficulty that both spacecrafts won't be able to use any of the RCS nozzles that are facing the other spacecraft during the operation. (Both for astronauts safety during their EVA and to prevent having the nozzles exhaust gases colliding with the other spacecraft)

One of the things the CAIB scenario gave, was that the rescue shuttle crew would have received training for the rescue operation during the shuttle prep time. While the astronauts inside STS-107 could not do training (with the need to lower both electric power needs and CO2 generation)

Edited October 26, 2015 by sgt_flyer

[KerikBalm]

It's all pointless anyway. Even if you do jury-rig some miraculous rescue plan, they simply did not know that there was damage sufficient to destroy the shuttle at the time. It's like wondering if the allies could have put together a plan to kill hitler in the 20s, preventing WW2; it's nonsense without assuming time travel.

Sure... Hindsight is 20:20... but even back then, if wikipedia is to be believed, the engineers wanted to check for damage:

In a risk-management scenario similar to the Challenger disaster, NASA management failed to recognize the relevance of engineering concerns for safety for imaging to inspect possible damage, and failed to respond to engineer requests about the status of astronaut inspection of the left wing. Engineers made three separate requests for Department of Defense (DOD) imaging of the shuttle in orbit to more precisely determine damage. While the images were not guaranteed to show the damage, the capability existed for imaging of sufficient resolution to provide meaningful examination. NASA management did not honor the requests and in some cases intervened to stop the DOD from assisting.

...

Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage was detected. This affected their stance on investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude.[14] In 2013, Hale recalled that Director of Mission Operations Jon C. Harpold told him before Columbia. '​s destruction:

You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS [Thermal Protection System]. If it has been damaged it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?[15]

Hale added, "I was hard pressed to disagree [at the time]. That mindset was widespread. Astronauts agreed.

If the engineers had their way, they would have known about the damage.

So, on to the next point:

Columbia didn't disintegrated due to lost ceramic heat shield tiles - what broke off was the RCC panels. And any RCC panel is larger than the ceramic tile.

I am aware... the point is that there is much evidence that even a compromised TPS can still be sufficient if its not too compromised.

Here is the outcome of one simulation btw:

A wing jury-rig might've make it either worser, or really weird. Imagine seeing a single-winged shuttle that needs to land if it turns out the on-orbit fix fails not-so-shortly before end of ionization phase.

They all died... how can it be worse? you're worried about a semi-intact shuttle causing damage on the ground?

The timeline:

8:44:09 -> crossed 120km altitude

8:48:39 -> Sensor shows higher "strain" on the left wing (not exactly sure what its measuring here... but its 4.5 minutes after re-entry started)

8:49:32 -> Columbia does planned roll to the right

8:50:53 -> "10 minute peak heating" time period begins

8:52:00 -> 480km off the CA coast, normal temperature would be 1450 C at this point

8:53:26 -> Crosses CA coast, normal temperature would be 1540 C at this point

8:53:46 -> First signs of debris coming off, the trail luminescence brightens... I guess this is when things started to fail

8:54:24 -> 4 hydraulic sensors start reading off scale low - either the hydraulics have failed, or the sensors have (wikipedia implies its the sensors)...

8:54:25 -> Crosses Nevada border, more bright flashes sighted

8:55:00 -> temperatures would normally be 1650 C

8:56:30 -> Columbia executes a planned roll reversal, to turn right instead of left -> indicates the elevons were still functioning at this point?

8:58:00 -> Temperatures would normally be 1580 C -> peak heating has passed

8:58:20 -> TPS tile comes off, most westward pieve of debris found (I guess the other stuff from earlier flashes all vaporized or wasn't found)

8:59:15 -> presure sensors for left landing gear fail... I'm guessing about this time the landing gear no longer worked, belly landing would still be possible?

8:59:32 -> Last cut off transmission of crew

8:59:37 -> Hydraulic pressure for control surfaces lost -> control lost, the crew is basically doomed at this point... roughly 4 minutes after peak heating. (assuming peak heating was at 8:55:00 when it reached 1650 C)

9:00:18 -> Orbiter starts to disintegrate

9:00:57 -> Crew killed by this point as the crew module breaks apart.

It seems like they almost made it... it wasn't until 8:59:37 that it became unrecoverable... temperatures were decreasing at that point... roughly what they were at 8:53:26 .... 6 minutes earlier

Seems like if they had something that had just bought them a few more minutes, they would have been able to land it (even if the orbiter would never fly again)

Anyway... another shuttle was being processed for a March 1 launch, this happened on February... if they could have cut the prep time in half, they could have done a rescue.

As for the repair:

NASA investigators determined that on-orbit repair by the shuttle astronauts was possible but overall considered "high risk", primarily due to the uncertain resiliency of the repair using available materials and the anticipated high risk of doing additional damage to the Orbiter.[56][57] Columbia did not carry the Canadarm, or Remote Manipulator System, which would normally be used for camera inspection or transporting a spacewalking astronaut to the wing. Therefore, an unusual emergency extra-vehicular activity (EVA) would have been required. While there was no astronaut EVA training for maneuvering to the wing, astronauts are always prepared for a similarly difficult emergency EVA to close the external tank umbilical doors located on the orbiter underside, which is necessary for reentry. Similar methods could have reached the shuttle left wing for inspection or repair.[57]

For the repair, the CAIB determined that the astronauts would have to use tools and small pieces of titanium, or other metal, scavenged from the crew cabin. These metals would help protect the wing structure and would be held in place during re-entry by a water-filled bag that had turned into ice in the cold of space. The ice and metal would help restore wing leading edge geometry, preventing a turbulent airflow over the wing and therefore keeping heating and burn-through levels low enough for the crew to survive re-entry and bail out before landing. The CAIB could not determine whether a patched-up left wing would have survived even a modified re-entry, and concluded that the rescue option would have had a considerably higher chance of bringing Columbia's crew back alive.

I don't know... maybe... seeing as how it made it past peak heating, if they could have put a piece of titanium over the hole, and got it to stay on until peak heating... seems to me it might have made it.

[Nibb31]

It seems like they almost made it... it wasn't until 8:59:37 that it became unrecoverable... temperatures were decreasing at that point... roughly what they were at 8:53:26 .... 6 minutes earlier

Seems like if they had something that had just bought them a few more minutes, they would have been able to land it (even if the orbiter would never fly again)

It wasn't a matter of temperature, but of aerodynamics. The damaged wing had a gaping hole in it, generating excessive drag and excessive lift, which induced excessive roll and put the Orbiter into an attitude where the hypersonic airflow ripped it apart. The problem would only have gotten worse as the atmospheric pressure increased.

I don't know... maybe... seeing as how it made it past peak heating, if they could have put a piece of titanium over the hole, and got it to stay on until peak heating... seems to me it might have made it.

Pieces of Titanium aren't usually carried on board the Shuttle. They could have tried to repair the hole with material scavenged from the stuff that they carried (foam, insulation, kapton tape...) but it is unlikely that it would have survived reentry.

[KerikBalm]

Well, as far as excessive roll... I haven't heard anything to suggest that the orbiter could not control its orientation prior to the catastrophic failure.

Stuff was vaporizing and coming off, as seens by the flashes... they continued to maintain control over roll and attitude, as evidenced by the planned roll left, then later roll right.

They lost hydrailic pressure before the disaster, which implies that the problem was failure of internal systems in the left wing, which implies it was destroyed by hot gases entering through the hole.

The drag and roll induced by this hole appear to have been within the ability of the oribter's control surfaces to correct... it wasn't firing RCS, it doesn't have magic reaction wheels like KSP.

The L/D of everything would change more or less proportionately as it got slower and into thicker air.

If it was maintaining heading high into reentry, it probably would continue to do so if it weren't for the loss of hydraulics.

The loss of hydraulics is the immediate cause of the loss of control and breakup... not the altered aerodynamics because of that hole.

As for the titanium... yea it sounded sort of weird to me that they expected to be able to scavenge titanium from what they had in the orbiter... maybe they had some titanium panels in the interior that could have been removed? I don't really know what sort of stuff they have inside that they could reasonably be expected to remove and use.

Apparently though, some at NASA thought it had a chance of working... which is better than nothing if the couldn't finish preparation of the other shuttle in half the normal time.

The engineers wanted to inspect the wing... management didn't let them.

The engineers seem to think that a jury rigged repair had a chance of getting the orbiter back somewhat intact...

If nothing was available for a rescue... then it seems they should have tried

[Kryten]

I was thinking of just using the Soyuz as a payload on the Ariane, covered by a payload fairing (like a comsat would), then having the Shuttle dock with it. Though the lack of EVA capability would doom such a mission anyways..

Launch 'like a comsat' involves a custom-built payload adapter, you don't just shove one on and go like in KSP. Put one together without proper analysis, and you can get resonance issues severe enough to destroy the payload.

[Nibb31]

Well, as far as excessive roll... I haven't heard anything to suggest that the orbiter could not control its orientation prior to the catastrophic failure.

From the CAIB report

Post-accident analysis of flight data that was generated after

telemetry information was lost showed another abrupt

change in the Orbiterʼs aerodynamics caused by a continued

progression of left wing damage at EI+917. The data

showed a significant increase in positive roll and negative

yaw, again indicating another increase in drag on and lift

from the damaged left wing. Columbiaʼs flight control system

attempted to compensate for this increased left yaw by

firing all four right yaw jets. Even with all thrusters firing,

combined with a maximum rate of change of aileron trim, the

flight control system was unable to control the left yaw, and

control of the Orbiter was lost at EI+970 seconds. Mission

Control lost all telemetry data from the Orbiter at EI+923

(8:59:32 a.m.). Civilian and military video cameras on the

ground documented the final breakup. The Modular Auxiliary

Data System stopped recording at EI+970 seconds.

Basically, Columbia didn't "burn up". First, the hole caused a burn-through that damaged the wing's aerodynamic properties. Then, because of that damage, the Orbiter lost control due to increasing aerodynamic forces. The break-up was a consequence of hitting the hypersonic airflow at a bad angle.

This is why, as you noted, it seemed to survive the peak heat, but only broke up a while later as the atmosphere became denser.

As for the titanium... yea it sounded sort of weird to me that they expected to be able to scavenge titanium from what they had in the orbiter...

Especially as the Shuttle's were made of aluminium, not titanium.

Edited October 26, 2015 by Nibb31

[andrewas]

Saving Columbia after the strike would have taken a miracle - but miracles are much more likely if you fight the problem rather than just accept that there's nothing you can do. Maybe a makeshift patch protected by ice would have been enough, maybe Atlantis could have been launched in time, maybe some genius at ESA could have saved the day with the Ariane that was launched a few weeks after the disaster. Deliver a proper patch, or maybe a lifeboat so the crew could survive till rescue. Who knows what they could have come up with, with seven lives on the line and a couple of weeks to save them.

Of course, the real chance to save Columbia was long before STS-107 , it was when they first observed foam falling from the tank and striking the orbiter. If they'd recognized the risk and improved the foam back then, shuttle may still be flying. Of course, you can say the same about the partial o-ring failures before STS-51-L, and probably a few other issues which could have had catastrophic consequences.

[KerikBalm]

Post-accident analysis of flight data that was generated after

telemetry information was lost showed another abrupt

change in the Orbiterʼs aerodynamics caused by a continued

progression of left wing damage at EI+917. The data

showed a significant increase in positive roll and negative

yaw, again indicating another increase in drag on and lift

from the damaged left wing. Columbiaʼs flight control system

attempted to compensate for this increased left yaw by

firing all four right yaw jets. Even with all thrusters firing,

combined with a maximum rate of change of aileron trim, the

flight control system was unable to control the left yaw, and

control of the Orbiter was lost at EI+970 seconds. Mission

Control lost all telemetry data from the Orbiter at EI+923

(8:59:32 a.m.). Civilian and military video cameras on the

ground documented the final breakup. The Modular Auxiliary

Data System stopped recording at EI+970 seconds.

Hmm, I hadn't heard that information....

#1) It mentions thrusters firing, so I was incorrect in assuming that the shuttle had been flying using purely aerodynamic control surfaces during re-entry

#2) It states "control of the Orbiter was lost at EI+970 seconds."

According to Wikipedia:

"8:59:37 (EI+928): Hydraulic pressure, which is required to move the flight control surfaces, was lost at about 8:59:37. At that time, the Master Alarm would have sounded for the loss of hydraulics, and the shuttle would have begun to lose control, starting to roll and yaw uncontrollably, and the crew would have become aware of the serious problem."

5 seconds later, the flight control surfaces would have stopped working (unclear if this is for the left wing, or the whole system).

If the hydraulics failed... then of course they wouldn't be able to control the orbiter. I'm not convinced that the asymetry in lift and drag alone was enough to cause this.

Based on the data, it seems reasonable that they lost control of the aerodynamic surfaces prior to breakup, and all that we can conclude is that the thruster system was inadequate to compensate for the asymetry.

If the aerodynamic control surfaces would have been sufficient to compensate, and they failed due to the heating of the inside of the wing... then its a matter of heating.

If the aerodynamic control surfaces would not have been sufficient to compensate, then the failure was due to altered aerodynamic properties.

In the end, yes, aerodynamic forces destroyed the craft.

They almost always do... the heating may weaken something... but when the orientation changes as a result... or things come apart and more surface area is exposed, the aerodynamic forces rapidly increase and tear the thing apart... you can even get behavior like this in KSP.

I was under the impression that its aerodynamic properties were initially "close enough", but then heating destroyed/weakened internal components, which lead to the aerodynamic properties no longer beng close enough... and the thing then broke apart at high speed.

Just like that SR-71 that suffered an asymetric flameout at mach 3+... rapidly changing orientation at high velocity will tear your craft apart, I don't dispute this.

It just seems to me that if the hydraulics failed, that of course it will not be able to maintain a heading anymore, and of course it will break up.

The point on that timeline I posted earlier where things were well and truly F-word-ed for the crew, was EI +928...

That failure would be due to heating, no?

[henryrasia]

Why didn't they try a slow reentry? As in making the perigee cause substantial drag, but not enough to risk the structural integrity of the wing. Then you pitch up and maintain flight around the world, descending as you slow down. 16 days is enough time to decelerate to subsonic speeds with little dynamic pressure. I guess because they didn't know the extent of the damage, but still, would it have been possible?

[Kryten]

Why didn't they try a slow reentry? As in making the perigee cause substantial drag, but not enough to risk the structural integrity of the wing. Then you pitch up and maintain flight around the world, descending as you slow down. 16 days is enough time to decelerate to subsonic speeds with little dynamic pressure. I guess because they didn't know the extent of the damage, but still, would it have been possible?

No. That's... that's just not how physics works. I'm almost certain this doesn't even work in KSP.

[Nibb31]

Why didn't they try a slow reentry? As in making the perigee cause substantial drag, but not enough to risk the structural integrity of the wing. Then you pitch up and maintain flight around the world, descending as you slow down. 16 days is enough time to decelerate to subsonic speeds with little dynamic pressure. I guess because they didn't know the extent of the damage, but still, would it have been possible?

If it was that easy, why would we even bother with having a heatshield?

As soon as you get below orbital speed (6.9km/s), you are coming down, and it won't take 16 days unless you have engines to sustain your flight. You are going to have to bleed off that energy whatever you do.

[peadar1987]

I'm guessing the shuttle was designed to fly as gentle a reentry as was possible anyway, to minimise heat loading on the shield. Its aerodynamic properties already gave it a far gentler reentry profile than a capsule

[Laie]

I refuse to believe that nothing would have been attempted.

Seriously, can you imagine a press conference where the speaker explains "there is nothing we can do and we won't even try", then let things play out over two weeks? Any attempt may be pointless and doomed from the outset, but IMO they'd have to at least keep up the pretense.

On a slightly related note, I heartily recommend Seveneves. It suffers from shortcomings similar to The Martian, but the good parts are a whole lot better.

[Rakaydos]

I refuse to believe that nothing would have been attempted.

Seriously, can you imagine a press conference where the speaker explains "there is nothing we can do and we won't even try", then let things play out over two weeks? Any attempt may be pointless and doomed from the outset, but IMO they'd have to at least keep up the pretense.

I believe that was part of the argument as to why nasa managament kept their heads in the sand. "If there's something wrong, there's nothing we can do about it. Investigating will just bring out a public pressure to do the impossible. We can better afford another shuttle loss then the loss of confidence of knowing the problem and failing to save them... AND a shuttle loss.

[Exoscientist]

...

No, food can't survive vacuum, but food would have been the least of their worries. The limitation was the CO2 scrubbers and the fuel cells. The article that I linked too says that the first EVA would have transferred new lithium canisters to Columbia, because the CO2 level would have been the biggest threat.

Unfortunately, pretty much everyone agrees that a rescue mission wasn't possible and they were doomed from the strike on.

The point is a rescue mission was ruled out because Atlantis couldn't be readied in time. But with resupply missions launched to Columbia, the stay time of Columbia in orbit could have been extended to allow Atlantis time to be launched.

Bob Clark

Edited November 2, 2015 by Exoscientist

[Nibb31]

The point is a rescue mission was ruled out because Atlantic couldn't be readied in time. But with resupply missions launched to Columbia, the stay time of Columbia in orbit could have been extended to allow Atlantis time to be launched.

Bob Clark

Let's reiterate.

1) No other spacecraft was available in the timeframe.

2) No other spacecraft was capable of reaching Columbia's orbit.

3) No other spacecraft had EVA capability and Columbia had no docking or berthing capability and no RMS.

4) No spacecraft had refueling capability which would have been necessary to prolong the on orbit lifetime of Columbia.

So effectively, the only spacecraft that could actually RV with Columbia was another Shuttle. Even if a Soyuz or Progress could have been sent, it would have been useless because there was no way to transfer any supplies over to Columbia.

[Beowolf]

3) No other spacecraft had EVA capability and Columbia had no docking or berthing capability and no RMS.

Nibb, I'm drawing a blank. What's RMS in the context of docking?

Thanks!

[More Boosters]

Nibb, I'm drawing a blank. What's RMS in the context of docking?

Thanks!

I'm going to take a guess and it stands for Remote Manuevering System; something to remotely control the resuplly probe from Columbia as there would be too much latency from the ground. Might be completely wrong.

[YNM]

Wait, Columbia didn't carry any SSRMS/Canadarm ? Thats... Dangerous ?

RMS : Remote Manipulator System actually. But I'm surprised it didn't carry any, considering that the RMS is very useful for any application... Checking the wing ? Going aft quickly ? Done that for you.

[Rakaydos]

Wait, Columbia didn't carry any SSRMS/Canadarm ? Thats... Dangerous ?

RMS : Remote Manipulator System actually. But I'm surprised it didn't carry any, considering that the RMS is very useful for any application... Checking the wing ? Going aft quickly ? Done that for you.

Why would it need it? it was a routine 0G science mission- empty cargo bay, low inclination orbit, saving as much rocket fuel as possible. Robot arm's just extra weight.

[Nibb31]

Nibb, I'm drawing a blank. What's RMS in the context of docking?

Thanks!

Remote Manipulator System or Canardarm. If you can't dock, you need some way to capture the visiting vehicle.

Wait, Columbia didn't carry any SSRMS/Canadarm ? Thats... Dangerous ?

RMS : Remote Manipulator System actually. But I'm surprised it didn't carry any, considering that the RMS is very useful for any application... Checking the wing ? Going aft quickly ? Done that for you.

Columbia was never fitted with an RMS or a docking adapter because it was the heaviest of the Orbiters. It carried extra structure, sensors, and equipment that was never removed after the early test flights (which is also why NASA was able to get so much information during the investigation).

They planned to have the docking adapter fitted after that flight, so that Columbia could finally visit the ISS.

The RMS wasn't needed for Spacehab missions anyway.

[Exoscientist]

Let's reiterate.

1) No other spacecraft was available in the timeframe.

2) No other spacecraft was capable of reaching Columbia's orbit.

That is not correct. There were at least 4 launches to orbit during the proposed 30 day timeframe before Columbia would have run out of air scrubbers:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_in_spaceflight

The Pegasus listed there is especially relevant since being airlaunched and using all solid stages should have shorter prep time. In fact the Pegasus could be launched within 7 days of notice, assuming the payload was available. The Minotaur 1 also has this capability:

Launch on Need, Part 2: Seven-Day Satellites for the Department of Defense.

"So what sort of launch on need missions have been defined? The Department of Defense Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) office has set a goal of being able to launch a satellite within seven days. Assuming ORS has stockpiled a couple of satellites for a bad day, Orbital Sciences (News - Alert) Corporation has several launch platforms it has demonstrated can do the job, including the Minotaur family and the air-launched Pegasus.

"Using a combination of surplus Minuteman missile and new-build solid rocket motors, Orbital's four stage Minotaur I has put 33 small satellites into orbit. The rocket can put up to 580 kilograms into low Earth orbit (LEO) and the TacSat-2 launch demonstrated the ability to go from payload load to launch in less than six days, plus the ability to keep the vehicle in a launch-ready mode for an extending period of time -- you have to have the rocket on hand rather than waiting six months to build and ship from the factory."

http://satellite.tmcnet.com/topics/satellite/articles/201224-launch-need-part-2-seven-day-satellites-the.htm

Bob Clark