The most confusing and baffling in science? (QuantumMechanics\Double Slit experiment)

[lodestar]

Potency is a property of something, making the pure form absurd.

I think you mean pure potency. Pure form are ideal forms. What's absurd in that? I don't understand your objection.

You're going to solipsism.

Not at all. Personal knowledge doesn't mean private, incommunicable knowledge. It simply means knowledge that can't be transmitted directly through language. It can only be transmitted as the description of a mental path that the interlocutor has to walk by himself and eventually find the same knowledge. In essence, that's what Philosophy is.

From that same assumption follows the far more parsimonious hypothesis, "The universe, its own initial cause, came into being"

There's nothing parsimonious about violating the law of identity. You're saying something can be something and nothing at the same time. If suspending logic itself is parsimonious, then any possible argument is valid for anything, no matter how absurd or nonsensical.

Intelligent design and creationism are the same thing: when creationism went out of style, creationists renamed their philosophy intelligent design.

Well, whatever is the latest hype-word in the endless battle between militant atheists and crackpot theists really doesn't have much of a role in this conversation and it's not something I care much about. That's not what we are talking about, as I said countless times. If you don't understand that, we should give up on this conversation, since it leads anywhere.

So are you abandoning empiricism?

Nope, I just accept it as a method, not a dogma.

Gravity is not fully understood.

So what?

Now you're just arguing from authority.

That's not an argument, it's an statement. If you don't know what the term means, and explaining it properly would demand considerable effort and time, there's just no way to have a productive conversation. Do you disagree with that?

If you're not arguing that it's scientific, then it belongs not in this forum subsection, and if it's philosophical, then your present justification most parsimoniously proves that the universe simply came into being.

The forum rules are incredibly lenient on the content, and I'm having a very interesting conversation with other members, so that remark is completely unnecessary.

Frankly, I don't understand your argument at all. I mean, if something I just said proves that the universe simply came into being and I don't even realize it, wow... I'm a lot smarter than I thought. At least I'm smarter than Lawrence Krauss, it seems...

Without evidence we have nothing but Occam's Razor whereby to make existence claims. If you want to further epistemeologically doubt, then consider the Munchausen Trilemma.

Not really, because proof is only needed for communicable knowledge. You need proof to transmit knowledge to someone else who requires it, not to acquire knowledge for yourself. Of course, you may require proof even for yourself, but as you already know, that inevitably leads to sollipsism, since you can't prove anything else besides your own mind exists.

Ad hominem. No true Scotsman and Moving the Goalposts.

First of all, logical fallacies don't apply to informal discourse, despite the plagueful proliferation of latin brocards in internet discussions. You employ logical fallacies after the discourse is formalized, and you very rarely need to address them directly since it becomes obvious by the time.

Second, despite the Ad Hominem fallacy being popularized in internet debates as synonym with personal attack, insults or something similar, that's not what ad hominem means.

Third, what I said isn't an argument, so saying it's Ad Hominem just doesn't make sense.

Non-sequitur: a geocentric universe could have Dark Matter.

Sure, it could, but it's not necessary.

Edited February 4, 2014 by lodestar

[Duxwing]

I think you mean pure potency. Pure form are ideal forms. What's absurd in that? I don't understand your objection.

You're saying that real things can be pure properties, but any property cannot exist without something thing.

Not at all. Personal knowledge doesn't mean private, incommunicable knowledge. It simply means knowledge that can't be transmitted directly through language. It can only be transmitted as the description of a mental path that the interlocutor has to walk by himself and eventually find the same knowledge. In essence, that's what Philosophy is.

If cannot say your point, then it exists not.

There's nothing parsimonious about violating the law of identity. You're saying something can be something and nothing at the same time. If suspending logic itself is parsimonious, then any possible argument is valid for anything, no matter how absurd or nonsensical.

My model suspends not reason: it states that the universe came into being, or specifically that time began.

Well, whatever is the latest hype-word in the endless battle between militant atheists and crackpot theists really doesn't have much of a role in this conversation and it's not something I care much about. That's not what we are talking about, as I said countless times. If you don't understand that, we should give up on this conversation, since it leads anywhere.

I'm an agnostic, not an atheist, and I am not militant, and it is what we're talking about. In your own words:

"Of course it is unempirical. So what? I'm not saying Intelligent Design is a scientific theory, I'm saying it's a philosophical problem."

You're dodging points.

Nope, I just accept it as a method, not a dogma.

Without evidence you must take it as dogma if you are to prevent epistemological nihilism.

So what?

So of course gravitational theories have fudge factors.

That's not an argument, it's an statement. If you don't know what the term means, and explaining it properly would demand considerable effort and time, there's just no way to have a productive conversation. Do you disagree with that?

You're not defining a relevant term and then trying to turn the argument around on me for not having already understood it. Part of defending your thesis is explaining it.

The forum rules are incredibly lenient on the content, and I'm having a very interesting conversation with other members, so that remark is completely unnecessary.

Frankly, I don't understand your argument at all. I mean, if something I just said proves that the universe simply came into being and I don't even realize it, wow... I'm a lot smarter than I thought. At least I'm smarter than Lawrence Krauss, it seems...

No, nothing you've said proves that the universe simply came into being.

Not really, because proof is only needed for communicable knowledge. You need proof to transmit knowledge to someone else who requires it, not to acquire knowledge for yourself. Of course, you may require proof even for yourself, but as you already know, that inevitably leads to sollipsism, since you can't prove anything else besides your own mind exists.

Aha! So you are a solipsist. And if you cannot communicate your knowledge, then you have no point.

First of all, logical fallacies don't apply to informal discourse, despite the plagueful proliferation of latin brocards in internet discussions. You employ logical fallacies after the discourse is formalized, and you very rarely need to address them directly since it becomes obvious by the time.

You're dodging and ad-homming again: these fallacies happen to exist specifically because of informal discourse, wherein forms other than formal logic are permitted.

Second, despite the Ad Hominem fallacy being popularized in internet debates as synonym with personal attack, insults or something similar, that's not what ad hominem means.

You were arguing that I was "too scientistic" and therefore wrong--in Latin, ad-hominem.

Third, what I said isn't an argument, so saying it's Ad Hominem just doesn't make sense.

Now you're just lying. You were arguing that "Occam's Razor as a methodological procedure doesn't matter in the context here".

Sure, it could, but it's not necessary.

Thus you contradict your previous argument: "As I said, in the current state of astrophysics and cosmology, the choice is between Dark Matter or geocentrism."

-Duxwing

[lodestar]

Seriously? Sorry man, but this just turned into a collection of hearsay and confusion, and I won't be dragged into that. If you want to continue the conversation, let's keep it to whatever is really substantial.

Edited February 5, 2014 by lodestar

[Z-Man]

It's not that at all. I'll try to explain, in the context of this topic. Let's say we don't apprehend reality directly through our senses, we form mental concepts that correspond to the real objects. The purpose of the scientific method is then to strip those concepts of anything that can't be described mathematically, not to know the objects in themselves, beyond our mental concepts (that's the role of philosophy, by the way). For instance, when we conceptualize an electron as a subatomic particle with negative charge, that's not all the electron is in reality, that's just all we need to describe it mathematically to understand a particular phenomenon.

With you so far.

For instance, think of a soda can and a piece of curtain rod, both made of aluminum. They may be made of the same atoms, have the same mass, and many other properties, but there's one fundamental difference about them that doesn't actually have physical existence, their form. The ideal form of a soda can and a piece of curtain rod can exist in our minds independently of any matter. So, we could divide reality in things that can be fully described mathematically without a residue, and things that can't be described without their forms, or in other words, without a corresponding mental concept, what Descartes called res extensae and res cogitas.

Form can exist without matter. Got that. What I don't see is how form cannot be described mathematically; to me, a rod is a cylinder with length and radius (idealized, obv.). I also don't see how form is not part of an objects physical existence; the form of a piece of metal has a huge influence on its electric properties, for example. I suppose that is because I treat form and shape as synonyms, right? Form is more the idea of an object? Like, it does not matter to the form of the rod how long it is or whether it is round or square, as long as it is rod-like?

The whole point is that a subatomic particle exists without form, it exists only within the res extensae, and the state vector collapses not when it interacts with the mind, but when it interacts with something within the res cogitans, something that can't be completely described within the res extensae, like a bubble chamber or a double slit cover and wall.

(Deleted stuff acknowledged)

So, a particle in a state of superposition exists only as potency, without form. The state vector is collapsed when it interacts with the measurement instrument, which has form and transfer act. What stops the superposition from breaking down most of the time is precisely that most of the time it's not being actualized by something.

The cat has substantial form, a photon doesn't.

Small apology and correction: When we were talking about superpositions the whole time, we actually should have meant pure states. Every pure state is a superposition in a suitably chosen basis, so superposition/no superposition is not a good distinction to make. The post-collapse situation, on the other hand, would be a mixed state. Pure and mixed states can be distinguished rigorously (in calculations and in repeatable experiments). The formalism to do so is of little relevance (I'll provide it if requested, of course). Also, sorry, my atom physics are a little rusty.

Ok. With that, take a deuterium atom (not regular hydrogen, we want to ignore the core's spin). We are only really interested in the electron. Its ground state is twofold degenerate, it has a total angular momentum of 1/2 (Orbital quantum numbers: n=1, l=0, m=0)

It has many excited states, some also with total angular momentum of 1/2. Put it into the pure state with the quantum numbers n=3, l=0, m=0 and electron spin pointing up.

Let it sit for a couple of milliseconds, then investigate its state. You will find it in a (partially) mixed state consisting of the two ground states. The process by which this happens is that the atom emits one or two photons and decays into the ground state directly or indirectly. What happens to the photons almost does not matter; the one thing you cannot do is feed them back to the atom by, say, putting it into a cavity. If they are caught by some matter, if you measure them, if they escape to infinity, if they crash into the moon: the atom will be in a mixed state.

How do you explain that? Nether the atom nor the photons have what it takes to cause collapse.

On the other end of the scale: In quantum optical experiments, photons bounce off mirrors, are focused by lenses or pass beamsplitters all of the time. That is an interaction. Momentum is transferred between photon and the device. Why does that not cause collapse? Do mirrors not have form?

Fine, but that strict determinism is a choice. It doesn't really solve the problem.

You are right in that it sweeps the philosophical questions under the rug. It is not deterministic, however. By allowing the collapse, the end result of all calculations will be non-deterministic, in accordance with what we seem to observe.

Not only because it's a fudge factor, but because it's a fudge factor adopted for ideological, not scientific reasons. When the ether was scrapped, taking with it simpler explanations for a plethora of electromagnetic phenomena, the main argument was that it was undetected or if it actually existed, it would mean Earth wasn't moving. OK, I could live with that. Years later, you have Dark Matter equally undetected, serving the exact opposite purpose of preserving the theory that solved the initial problem and scrapped the ether, and people act like it's no problem at all. Why the double standard? That's what I call imposture, and that's done for ideological motivations.

Data in support for a physical Aether instead of spacetime/EM field responsible for electromagnetic interactions: 0. It's not that we didn't try!

Data in support for dark matter: Well, it is supposed to have gravity, so we have some. As has been noted, galaxy rotation speed, galaxy cluster relative speeds, cosmology, speed of early gravitational collapses forming the first galaxies and stars, strength of observed gravity lenses. One solution fitting several independent problems.

Furthermore, dark matter behaves like ordinary matter, that is why nobody has a problem with it. The ether got a little weird towards the end. Aether drag?

If you want to pick out something from mainstream cosmology, pick Inflation. Your critique actually applies there. Bonus: Inflation supposedly generated the homogeneity you don't like anyway!

As to introducing complexity and reducing verifiability, even though we could argue a little on that, I'd say reality is under no obligation to present itself to us in a simple intelligible way. That's our approach to understand it, assuming those properties. If the universe isn't isotropic then it isn't isotropic, and no matter how complicated it can be, assuming it is will lead to wrong results.

Please list some good wrong results large scale homogeneity and isotropy produce.

If I understand your objection correctly, the problem is that you're not taking the whole package. I wouldn't say odd because that qualifier is merely cultural, but yes, that leaves you with a very small, dense, closed and young universe, but also with the Earth in the center and the universe spinning around. Your symmetrical outbound gravity field that keeps everything from falling apart is nothing but good old centrifugal force.

Umm. Please elaborate how that would work. Surely not rotation in 3D space? That would leave an axis without redshift. It also can't be rotation of General Relativity Spacetime in some external space, GR only cares about internal properties and would just ignore an external rotation. The only thing I could come up with is starting with 6+1 Minkovsky space, then forcing the universe to a rotating 3+1 subspace. This leads to the effective metric (ds)^2 = (dr)^2 - (c^2-(omega r)^2) dt^2... which has a naked singularity at r = c/omega with euclidean space on the other side. Not a horrible singularity, wave equations work just fine, but still, objects approaching it from our side are violently squished. And as the centrifugal force pushes everything out, we should be able to observe such events, even though they happen at huuuge redshifts (the huge energy produced offsets that)... You are going to tell me that's the microwave background, aren't you? That probably would not work out. This model would predict fluctuations we do not see. (And note, for the sake of the argument, I am ignoring the huge conceptual problems. Like, why is it rotating? What provides the energy?)

Anyway, even if you interpret redshifts to be Doppler, expansion of the space itself, compton effect, or any other interpretation that escapes the problem of having to put Earth in the center, you're still left with the problem of quasar redshift distribution, that persists no matter what interpretation you choose. Even if we stick with the standard model, you still have 23760 known quasars distributed in uniform concentric shells around the Earth, and currently there's no solution to that other than admitting Earth is in a privileged frame. This is really an unsolved issue.

Redshift quantization? Sorry, that was a blip in limited data. Didn't hold up. I think you underestimate the desire of scientists to publish findings that contradict "dogma". Finding something that cannot be explained by current theories and models is every experimentator's dream. Edited February 5, 2014 by Z-Man

[Duxwing]

Seriously? Sorry man, but this just turned into a collection of hearsay and confusion, and I won't be dragged into that. If you want to continue the conversation, let's keep it to whatever is really substantial.

I accept your conceding all points that you heretofor contested.

-Duxwing

[lodestar]

Form can exist without matter. Got that. What I don't see is how form cannot be described mathematically; to me, a rod is a cylinder with length and radius (idealized, obv.). I also don't see how form is not part of an objects physical existence; the form of a piece of metal has a huge influence on its electric properties, for example. I suppose that is because I treat form and shape as synonyms, right? Form is more the idea of an object? Like, it does not matter to the form of the rod how long it is or whether it is round or square, as long as it is rod-like?

Yes, you're confusing form and shape, but what is really curious is that you're committing the exact same mistake, trying to reduce everything to the realm of the res extensae. That's the whole point. Yes, you can say a rod is a cylinder with length and radius, but that's precisely stripping the concept you have of the real object to the quantifiable properties. As you said, that's an ideal rod, that's not all that a rod is in reality. I'm not talking of idealization vs. the real object. I'm not just saying that the real object, no matter how perfectly shaped will never be exactly the ideal. I'm talking of essence. Answering what parts a rod is made of doesn't answer what a rod actually is.

No matter how much you reduce something into its measurable parts, you're in the end just describing from how many parts its made of, not its essence. That's the distinction made between physical and corporeal object. The physical object is the collection of the measurable properties, that aren't directly perceptible to us, while the corporeal object is the closest thing to the mental concept we form of the real object. Any measurement instrument is doing nothing but translating a particular property from the physical to the corporeal.

How do you explain that? Nether the atom nor the photons have what it takes to cause collapse.

Yep, we've been talking of pure states only for the sake of simplicity, but it doesn't change things. The problem is you're still thinking of it in terms of res extensae. We're changing the metaphysical premises used from the cartesian to thomist, that's the whole point. You keep talking of the atoms and photons as objects with substantial forms. When you say the atom will be in a mixed state, that's a physical observation, not corporeal. When the system is effectively actualized by observation, you can compute the probability distribution for the final corporeal object in either one, pure or mixed, even if the way you combine probabilities is different.

Keep in mind one thing. We're not talking of an alternative to quantum mechanics. This is not trying to answer 'how' the collapse happens, but rather 'why'. No matter how much you try, and we tried a lot, you can't answer that 'why' with the cartesian ontology without bridging the bifurcation gap (and Descartes himself used a very tortuous argument to do that, ultimately resorting to a benevolent God that wouldn't deceive him by mismatching the res extensae and the res cogitans). You can, however, answer the 'why' in terms of thomist ontology, theory of forms, potency and act, etc.

If you're really interested in going deeper in the subject, I'd really recommend you to read Wolfgang Smith's The Quantum Enigma.

On the other end of the scale: In quantum optical experiments, photons bounce off mirrors, are focused by lenses or pass beamsplitters all of the time. That is an interaction. Momentum is transferred between photon and the device. Why does that not cause collapse? Do mirrors not have form?

You're confusing things a little, but I think that's my fault. Collapse isn't caused by interacting with any corporeal object, but by interacting with a corporeal object that confers a substantial form. Lenses, mirrors and beamsplitters don't actualize the photons into visible light, or in other words, they don't confer the photons the substantial form of the original image, your retina does.

You are right in that it sweeps the philosophical questions under the rug. It is not deterministic, however. By allowing the collapse, the end result of all calculations will be non-deterministic, in accordance with what we seem to observe.

Actually it is, since you're saying only the result of the calculations is non-deterministic, because you take them to be an approximation. You're saying reality itself might be deterministic, we just don't have the tools to determine.

Data in support for a physical Aether instead of spacetime/EM field responsible for electromagnetic interactions: 0. It's not that we didn't try!

Not really. You're trying to eat your cake and have it at the same time.

First of all, there's plenty of data in support of the ether, the only problem is that same data implies a motionless Earth and therefore an absolute reference frame too. We did try a lot to find data supporting an ether without a motionless Earth, and that's indeed zero.

Second, to solve the problem of absence of relative motion observed in the Michelson-Morley experiment in a way that could get rid of a motionless Earth, Special Relativity had to claim both the absence of ether and the finite speed of light. Einstein knew very well that the whole conundrum could be solved by a motionless Earth, because Lorentz had already made that clear. It was just unacceptable on ideological grounds. To cover accelerated frames, Einstein had to come up with General Relativity, and he not only scrapped the finite speed of light, but also got the ether back by playing semantics on the term 'space', since the relativistic space isn't really a vacuum space but has physical properties in the same way the ether would. Read Ludwik Kostro's, Einstein and The Ether, who traces the whole history of how Einstein got the ether back after dismissing it. Einstein himself admits this at several moments:

In 1905 I was of the opinion that it was no longer allowed to speak about the ether in physics. This opinion, however, was too radical, as we will see later when we discuss the general theory of relativity. It does remain allowed, as always, to introduce a medium filling all space and to assume that the electromagnetic fields (and matter as well) are its states…once again “empty†space appears as endowed with physical properties, i.e., no longer as physically empty, as seemed to be the case according to special relativity. One can thus say that the ether is resurrected in the general theory of relativity….Since in the new theory, metric facts can no longer be separated from “true†physical facts, the concepts of “space†and “ether†merge together.

So, first nobody wanted to dismiss the ether because it would be almost impossible to explain the electromagnetic phenomena as waves without a medium. Then, between that and a motionless Earth, they prefer to reinvent physics and keep the first option. Then the guy who did that admits the reinvention doesn't work so well and gets the ether back in the picture by playing semantics and disguising it under the name "space". Come on... that's like Lawrence Krauss claiming the universe came from nothing, but when you read the first page, the 'nothing' actually means 'quantum vacuum', not absence of being.

Third, not only the ether is present but disguised in the General Relativity, but it's also comparable to the CMB, in that it can be also used as a rest frame, and as a viable ingredient of its composition. Again, it's just playing semantics. Let's not call it ether because that sounds too aristotelian. Let's call it something else. As to candidates for the material composition, I'm sure there are more than adequate ingredients in the sea of particles and subparticles found in the last century.

Data in support for dark matter: Well, it is supposed to have gravity, so we have some. As has been noted, galaxy rotation speed, galaxy cluster relative speeds, cosmology, speed of early gravitational collapses forming the first galaxies and stars, strength of observed gravity lenses. One solution fitting several independent problems.

First, every piece of data in support of Dark Matter also supports an universe without Big Bang, expansion, relativity and Dark Matter. It just depends on how you interpret it. If that's the case, by Occam's Razor we should avoid the alternative with unfounded assumptions, but for some reason we don't.

Second, to call Dark Matter a solution to several independent problems is really pushing it too far. This is speculation, but I'd say any scientific theory in any field that somehow misses the target for 95% wouldn't be taken seriously. Dark Matter is because the obvious alternative is ideologically unacceptable.

Third, as I said before, even on the grounds of pure logic, Dark Matter can be safely dismissed because it can be used ipsis-litteris as a reductio ad absurdum argument. This is the one single argument that can't be refuted. To adopt Dark Matter as a possibility is the most illogical decision, because it can be used as an argument against itself.

Furthermore, dark matter behaves like ordinary matter, that is why nobody has a problem with it.

How do you know? Do you have some in your pocket right now? Come on... of course we say it behaves like ordinary matter, because that's what's needed for the field equations to work. That's like going to buy a house saying "look, I know my bank statement says my account is negative right now, but I have a million dollars of make-believe money that behaves like ordinary money, and you shouldn't have a problem accepting it". Frankly, I find it amusing that so many scientists fancy themselves as enlightened skeptics, yet promptly accept such nonsense.

And to say that nobody has a problem with it is a real understatement. Critics of Dark Matter theory aren't few, and aren't tinfoil hat lunatics.

The ether got a little weird towards the end. Aether drag?

Again, you're trying to eat your cake and have it. Ether drag was a theory to preserve the ether with a moving Earth. The Earth drags the inner layer of ether around, that's why we don't detect any relative movement. It's a reasonable theory, that couldn't be tested at the time but can be tested today by performing the Michelson-Morley experiment on the Moon, for instance. If there's an ether drag comparable with the translational velocity, it's evidence the Earth is indeed not moving relative to the ether. If there's the same negligible drag as the Earth, nothing changes.

As to be weird, that's cultural. Frankly, it's no weirder than frame-dragging after all. Personally, I don't think that's any weirder than the alternative castle of cards of singularities, spacetime, curved space, action-at-a-distance, no-euclidean geometry, no absolutes, mass distortion, etc.

If you want to pick out something from mainstream cosmology, pick Inflation. Your critique actually applies there. Bonus: Inflation supposedly generated the homogeneity you don't like anyway!

First, I'm not picking anything out. It's not like there's one or two inconsistencies and I'm being obnoxious by clinging to them. There's 95% of inconsistencies.

Second, homogeneity already is an assumption, so that's a petitio principii. I don't have to pick inflation, since that's theorized to preserve the assumption of homogeneity.

Please list some good wrong results large scale homogeneity and isotropy produce

I never said they produce 'wrong' results. I said there are valid interpretations with and without both homogeneity and isotropy. I have a problem with dismissing something on ideological, not scientific grounds. That's all this is about.

Umm. Please elaborate how that would work. Surely not rotation in 3D space?

Precisely that, but the rotation of the ether itself.

That would leave an axis without redshift. It also can't be rotation of General Relativity Spacetime in some external space, GR only cares about internal properties and would just ignore an external rotation. The only thing I could come up with is starting with 6+1 Minkovsky space, then forcing the universe to a rotating 3+1 subspace. This leads to the effective metric (ds)^2 = (dr)^2 - (c^2-(omega r)^2) dt^2... which has a naked singularity at r = c/omega with euclidean space on the other side. Not a horrible singularity, wave equations work just fine, but still, objects approaching it from our side are violently squished. And as the centrifugal force pushes everything out, we should be able to observe such events, even though they happen at huuuge redshifts (the huge energy produced offsets that)...

First, you're considering only the rotation around one axis, leaving aside the movement corresponding to the Earth's rotation tilt. The universe would be more like a gyroscope that wobbles when it begins to tilt than a carousel.

Second, you're again trying to eat your cake and keep it. The Lense-Thirring effect translated to a purely newtonian universe would in fact be merely an axial component in the centrifugal force, that pulls toward the equator of the rotating sphere, in addition to the radial component usually associated with centrifugal force. That axial component pivots on the barycenter, the Earth, and keeps coming back to the equatorial plane, just like you'd have orbits precessing around the spin axis or the orbited body. Thirring himself, while inadvertently providing a geocentric model, showed how all the forces unresolved by Newtonian, centrifugal, coriolis, etc, are present in the same way in a rotating universe with a central Earth due to that axial component.

Frankly, I think trying to explain the Lense-Thirring effect as frame-dragging is pretty much just another attempt to save face, giving a space-time cause to something that can be explained with a purely physical cause if you admit an absolute frame.

Finally, in the context of the discussion here, we're considering the option where General Relativity is completely left out of the picture, since we're saying there's an absolute reference frame. IF there's no absolute reference frame, then who is stationary and who is spinning around is merely a choice of reference frames. I think you're complicating things, because if GR is valid, then that has to be valid too. However, Sungenis claims even geocentrism with an absolute rest frame in the form of an anisotropic center still works even in GR as a mirror image, with the Lemaítre-Tolman-Bondi metric, with Earth in the center of the sphere, obviously.

You are going to tell me that's the microwave background, aren't you? That probably would not work out. This model would predict fluctuations we do not see.

Humm... is that really a problem? Can't I just call them Dark Fluctuations and say they actually exist? Just kidding.

(And note, for the sake of the argument, I am ignoring the huge conceptual problems. Like, why is it rotating? What provides the energy?)

Once in motion it keeps rotating by inertia, of course. I think you mean how it was set in motion, but that's no bigger conceptual problem than to know what banged the Big Bang.

Redshift quantization? Sorry, that was a blip in limited data. Didn't hold up. I think you underestimate the desire of scientists to publish findings that contradict "dogma". Finding something that cannot be explained by current theories and models is every experimentator's dream.

I think you underestimate the desire of scientists to ignore or circumvent findings that contradict dogma, specially when it has implications as this one. That redshift quantization was a blip in data was claimed since they were found, as the obvious alternative is unacceptable. This issue is certainly much more complicated than it seems. Let's say we can establish a reasonably recent status quaestionis from this 2006 study by Bell and McDiarmid on the SDSS catalog:

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0603169

While it concludes some of the peaks are selection effects, it acknowledges they can't account for all of them. Then we have Schneider's study of 2007, claiming all of the peaks in the 2006 study were indeed selection effects.

http://arxiv.org/abs/0704.0806

And finally, we have Hartnett's study of 2008, claiming that Schneider et al. actually also introduced another selection effect when filtering data, and there's indeed a periodicity in the SDSS quasar redshift data. However, he saw a correlation between that and the zConf parameter in the SDSS tables, and his conclusion is that whatever their cause, they are fundamentally connected, so it's safe to assume that the remaining peaks are indeed another selection effect, to be properly identified, but probably originated in the algorithm used by the SDSS to define the zConf parameter.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/0712.3833.pdf

That's still far from solving it as a blip. Since I couldn't find any response to Hartnett, I decided to investigate the correlation myself on the SDSS public database. Curiously, the zConf parameter that correlates with the peaks is the redshift estimate confidence. When you plot the fourier frequency for the whole database, the peaks aren't significant, but as you increase the estimate confidence, filtering data out, the peaks become more and more accentuated. At this point, the obvious question is, what's really wrong with that correlation?

If there's indeed a redshift uniformity in reality, then it will become more proeminent as you increase the confidence of the data and remove noise. Frankly, I see nothing wrong with that. Obviously, there could be something wrong with the algorithm determining zConf, but it's quite a coincidence. If the confidence factor has a correlation with the result, you don't like the result, you throw doubt on the confidence factor? That's almost like making the universe looking like everywhere is the center when some observations shows you are in the center and you don't like that. I've seen that before.

As a side note, it's worth mentioning that Hartnett first submitted his study in 2007 and published it in 2008 with the title “Redshift periodicity in quasar number counts from Sloan Digital Sky Surveyâ€Â, but actually he doesn't mention the conclusion that this is due to a correlation with the zConf parameter anywhere. As a matter of fact, his conclusion is that there's significant periodicity, regardless of the interpretation, the exact opposite conclusion. He changed it in a 2009 revision. The issue seems volatile enough even for a single author. Sungenis quotes the first revision on his book, so I'll even ask him if he's aware Hartnett reversed the conclusion and what he has to say about it.

http://xxx.tau.ac.il/pdf/0712.3833v2.pdf

Finally, even if quasar redshift quantization is just a blip, you still have similarly geocentrically oriented phenomena in galaxies, in spectroscopic binaries, in globular clusters, in planetary orbits, in the CMB, etc. If everything is a blip, that's quite a blip. I'd call it the Big Blip.

Edited February 6, 2014 by lodestar

[metaphor]

This seems like an interesting discussion. I'm not exactly understanding your hypothesis, lodestar.

If I understand your objection correctly, the problem is that you're not taking the whole package. I wouldn't say odd because that qualifier is merely cultural, but yes, that leaves you with a very small, dense, closed and young universe, but also with the Earth in the center and the universe spinning around. Your symmetrical outbound gravity field that keeps everything from falling apart is nothing but good old centrifugal force.

Wouldn't centrifugal force only work in one direction along the "equator"? The matter near the "poles" would still be attracted inward no matter how fast the spin was.

Anyway, even if you interpret redshifts to be Doppler, expansion of the space itself, compton effect, or any other interpretation that escapes the problem of having to put Earth in the center, you're still left with the problem of quasar redshift distribution, that persists no matter what interpretation you choose. Even if we stick with the standard model, you still have 23760 known quasars distributed in uniform concentric shells around the Earth, and currently there's no solution to that other than admitting Earth is in a privileged frame. This is really an unsolved issue.

The closest quasar is more than 2 billion light-years away. At that scale, couldn't you say the known quasars are distributed in uniform concentric shells around Mars, Alpha Centauri, or the Andromeda Galaxy? What makes the Earth itself special? Is it because we live on it?

[3_bit]

It's simple really. Our entire universe is a simulation being run on a computer. The slit experiment just exposes a flaw in the simulation.

Not an unreasonable conclusion. It is possible that the detecter, when plugged in, created a field of some kind that may have affected the particles. (I'm really no professional scientist but I can still speculate) I imagine plugging it in, but not cutting the lines of the data output from the detector, might yield different results. Then we can get closer to what "observing" it means. Now what if we were to do the experiment in a vacuum? Or in an atmosphere that is positively charged? I have yet to do further reading, but frankly, this experiment can lead to a lot more like it, that would surely be very useful to the world of quantum mechanics.

[lodestar]

This seems like an interesting discussion. I'm not exactly understanding your hypothesis, lodestar.

My hypothesis is simply that there are many valid interpretations to what we see from the Earth, yet physicists choose one not because it's more scientific, but because it has more appeal with their ideological convictions.

Wouldn't centrifugal force only work in one direction along the "equator"? The matter near the "poles" would still be attracted inward no matter how fast the spin was.

Not really. As I answered to a similar objection from Z-Man above, due to the Lense-Thirring effect, the centrifugal force in a purely newtonian universe would in fact have an axial component that pulls all points away from the equatorial plane towards it.

The closest quasar is more than 2 billion light-years away. At that scale, couldn't you say the known quasars are distributed in uniform concentric shells around Mars, Alpha Centauri, or the Andromeda Galaxy?

Sure, but that still means Earth is on the only quasar free region of space, a Copernican embarrassment anyway. Once you irrevocably break the assumption of isotropy, there isn't much more left to keep Earth outside the center of an absolute frame of reference.

What makes the Earth itself special? Is it because we live on it?

Isn't that enough for you?

Edited February 5, 2014 by lodestar

[SFJackBauer]

The double slit experiment can appear confusing at first, but that's only because we have been educated for a long time about the macro world. The mechanics of things at quantum scale are completely different than the mechanics of things at a large scale, that's all. Once you accept it, then you stop saying "that can't be true".

My favorite lectures I have watched not in person, but through Youtube - the Feynman lectures. I haven't found elsewhere this right combination of a cool guy, very smart but also down-to-earth, talking about a fascinating subject. If you have the time to spare, search for it, instead of watching videos of kittens and Justin Bieber all day.

[lodestar]

The double slit experiment can appear confusing at first, but that's only because we have been educated for a long time about the macro world.

Indeed.

The mechanics of things at quantum scale are completely different than the mechanics of things at a large scale, that's all.

Not necessarily. That conclusion is also a product of our cultural background, heavily influenced by the cartesian ontology of mind/body duality. If you follow my (long) explanation to Z-Man above, the whole point is precisely that you can simply replace those premises with others. If you replace them with the thomist ontology, then the mechanics of things at quantum scale are exactly the same of those at large scale.

Once you accept it, then you stop saying "that can't be true".

Well... accepting the problem as part of reality doesn't really solve the problem. That's what Stephen Hawking proposes we do in his The Grand Design. Just give up, accept that reality itself is confusing, and use whatever incomplete model works for the moment. It doesn't really answer the question. When you reach that point, it's time to re-examine your premises.

My favorite lectures I have watched not in person, but through Youtube - the Feynman lectures. I haven't found elsewhere this right combination of a cool guy, very smart but also down-to-earth, talking about a fascinating subject. If you have the time to spare, search for it, instead of watching videos of kittens and Justin Bieber all day.

+1.

[Z-Man]

The problem is you're still thinking of it in terms of res extensae.

You keep bringing it up! I don't think in that category because to me, mind, consciousness and all that are emergent phenomena. They have no separate existence. That does not make them not worth talking about, but they are not first class citizens. And if that side of the coin effectively does not exist, the other loses its meaning.

You keep talking of the atoms and photons as objects with substantial forms.

When you say the atom will be in a mixed state, that's a physical observation, not corporeal. When the system is effectively actualized by observation, you can compute the probability distribution for the final corporeal object in either one, pure or mixed, even if the way you combine probabilities is different.

Yes, that is the basic observation for the equivalence of the different interpretations of QM. At the very least, everything you can calculate in mixed states, you can calculate with pure states just as well and only forget about (trace out) what is of no interest to you later.

This is not trying to answer 'how' the collapse happens, but rather 'why'.

Ok, but I don't think you have given an answer to that yet.

You're confusing things a little, but I think that's my fault. Collapse isn't caused by interacting with any corporeal object, but by interacting with a corporeal object that confers a substantial form. Lenses, mirrors and beamsplitters don't actualize the photons into visible light, or in other words, they don't confer the photons the substantial form of the original image, your retina does.

Hmm. You are saying that for your philosophy, what the theory considers the collapse or transition from pure to mixed state is of no concern? So I can calculate the collapse whenever I think is late enough to still give correct results and you will not burn me at the stake? But the final act, the turning of a probability distribution into one of the possible realizations, that's the part where the substantial form comes in?

Works, I guess. I don't really see how that helps understand QM, especially since it seems to only go to the level of classical probability distributions (that's what mixed states are, essentially), but it may help those familiar with the material.

Actually it is, since you're saying only the result of the calculations is non-deterministic, because you take them to be an approximation. You're saying reality itself might be deterministic, we just don't have the tools to determine.

The result of the calculation is a probability distribution and as such perfectly deterministic. But of course it is only probabilities, so the final result is non-deterministic. And yes, reality may be deterministic (and I'd say it probably is), but neither will we be able to prove it nor does it really matter.

Aether: Yes, the MM-Experiment was only performed at rest relative to earth. I tried finding references to experiments done on planes, but came up blank (I blame the language, partially). I'd love to see that corrected, and if anyone knows of such things, please tell. But: That is completely irrelevant. None of the aether models that matched other observations (most prominently, Aberration) has Earth stationary relative to the Aether. None of them predicted gravity lensing.

And yes, spacetime (or the EM-Field) is the new Aether. Perfectly well known. The observable difference? The explicit impossibility of measuring absolute speeds relative to spacetime. It's simply a concept that does not exist. GR spacetime also carries gravity and has curvature, nothing the Aether was ever thought to have. The conceptual difference? It is not thought of as consisting of anything. Still, if it makes you happy, you can call spacetime the Aether. Had history moved a little differently, we'd all be doing that. Does not change that it differs from ye olde Aether.

and he not only scrapped the finite speed of light

What? When did that happen?

Third, not only the ether is present but disguised in the General Relativity, but it's also comparable to the CMB, in that it can be also used as a rest frame, and as a viable ingredient of its composition.

The CMB rest frame is important in cosmology, yes, but is of absolutely zero special importance in GR itself.

As to candidates for the material composition, I'm sure there are more than adequate ingredients in the sea of particles and subparticles found in the last century.

Indeed there is! It's called the Photon

First, every piece of data in support of Dark Matter also supports an universe without Big Bang, expansion, relativity and Dark Matter. It just depends on how you interpret it. If that's the case, by Occam's Razor we should avoid the alternative with unfounded assumptions, but for some reason we don't.

You gave zero alternative explanations.

Second, to call Dark Matter a solution to several independent problems is really pushing it too far. This is speculation, but I'd say any scientific theory in any field that somehow misses the target for 95% wouldn't be taken seriously. Dark Matter is because the obvious alternative is ideologically unacceptable.

Again, where is the proof?

Third, as I said before, even on the grounds of pure logic, Dark Matter can be safely dismissed because it can be used ipsis-litteris as a reductio ad absurdum argument. This is the one single argument that can't be refuted. To adopt Dark Matter as a possibility is the most illogical decision, because it can be used as an argument against itself.

What? How is it self-contradictory?

How do you know? Do you have some in your pocket right now?

Well, now that you ask, probably yes!

You should be familiar with the term "Hypothesis". That's what Dark Matter is. It's properties are conjectured, and then you work with that and calculate what results you get. Then you compare that to observations. Several candidates for Dark Matter have already been ruled out by that process: Too much hot dark matter does not work; it would solve the cosmological problem, but not aid in lumping or holding galaxies together. Neutrinos are out, they are too light (and would also be hot). Black hole remnants are out, IIRC. Still in the race: WIMPs in general and the lightest supersymmetric partner particle in particular, should such a thing exist and be electrically neutral.

And to say that nobody has a problem with it is a real understatement. Critics of Dark Matter theory aren't few, and aren't tinfoil hat lunatics.

True, and they are welcome. Always look for better alternatives. But dismissing DM outright because... well, you haven't really given a compelling reason. Where was I? Oh, yeah, I think you're doing what you claim we others are doing here.

As to be weird, that's cultural. Frankly, it's no weirder than frame-dragging after all.

True. I withdraw that statement. Ether drag, while slightly ugly in its details, was the best knowable possible solution for the problems back then.

I never said they produce 'wrong' results. I said there are valid interpretations with and without both homogeneity and isotropy. I have a problem with dismissing something on ideological, not scientific grounds. That's all this is about.

Fair enough. But the parameter count/Occams Razor arguments from earlier still stand. Fewer free parameters are to be preferred.

Precisely that, but the rotation of the ether itself. First, you're considering only the rotation around one axis, leaving aside the movement corresponding to the Earth's rotation tilt. The universe would be more like a gyroscope that wobbles when it begins to tilt than a carousel.

Oooookay... with ether = spacetime?

The Lense-Thirring effect translated to a purely newtonian universe

You can't do that and expect correct or even meaningful results. That's like, nah, worse than doing a calculations with complex numbers and just taking the real part.

that pulls toward the equator of the rotating sphere

That would be the wrong direction and produce blueshift along the axis. Or rather, just like the centrifugal force, nothing at all because you are in a Newtonian universe.

I think you're complicating things, because if GR is valid, then that has to be valid too. However, Sungenis claims even geocentrism with an absolute rest frame in the form of an anisotropic center still works even in GR as a mirror image, with the Lemaítre-Tolman-Bondi metric, with Earth in the center of the sphere, obviously.

Also a well known fact, yes. GR is constructed to allow any coordinate choice, stationary earth is one of them. Two problems: First, claiming this is a preferred coordinate system contradicts the intent of the theory, and more importantly, it still won't produce centrifugal forces for your alternative redshift.

Once in motion it keeps rotating by inertia, of course. I think you mean how it was set in motion, but that's no bigger conceptual problem than to know what banged the Big Bang.

My 6+1 model, the one that would actually contain your centrifugal redshift, would have required constant external energy and angular momentum input. And now that you mention it, a rotating universe would also be a much more special initial condition than your standard big bang. That is a problem.

Quasars:

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0603169

Ok, it is getting late. I wanted to prepare a graph, now words will have to do. They, and the other papers, as the very first analysis step, do a Fourier transform on the raw data, consisting of the number of quasars per redshift interval, redshift being an in principle arbitrary positive number. A Fast Fourier Transform.

(Small pause to allow those who know what FFT does to figure out what happens)

Again, two problems. The first is the FFT. It operates on a finite interval and assumes the data is periodically repeated outside that interval. The redshift histogram, evidently, does not wrap around. We do not know as many quasars with Z = 6 as we do with Z=1. That is the smaller problem.

The big problem is that, as the data is not normalized against anything, it mostly is a bulk between Z=0 and 2, the area where we have the best chances to actually detect Quasars. The Fourier transform of any such bulk will show maxima at frequencies corresponding to odd multiples of the inverse bulk width. That is just a simple math fact. Take a simple step function (or triangle if you like), Fourier transform it, and you will see those peaks.

What I am saying here, bluntly, is that the claimed periodicity is not even a statistical blip or selection effect. It is a fundamental error in the analysis method.

Edit: Also, Feynman on Youtube? What a wonderful world we live in! I did not even know his lectures were recor... filmed, I guess?

Edit2: Picture. Note how much smoother the mock distribution is than the real one, and still FFT shows clear signs of quantization.

No, I don't think so. And isn't that contradicting what you just said? I realize they are from different realms, but would res extensae not imply without form? When you say they don't have substantial (new addition here?) form, well, I accept that as so by definition, because I have to.

Edited February 7, 2014 by Z-Man
Adding picture.

[lodestar]

Sorry for taking so long. I was away during the weekend and trying to stay away from a computer for at least two days.

You keep bringing it up! I don't think in that category because to me, mind, consciousness and all that are emergent phenomena. They have no separate existence.

Well... that's precisely what "thinking in terms of res extensae" means. Really, you nailed it. I think I couldn't come up with a more concise definition if I tried.

That's the hidden premise that causes the whole mess. You can't prove that empirically because you can't separate a cognizable object from the cogniscent subject, yet, you carry that separation all the time. When you face a phenomena where you actually have to consider the mind having separate existence and the act of knowing as an union between the cognizable object and the cogniscent subject, you're doomed to fail. Frankly, I don't know how else to explain it to you. Unfortunately, most people with a scientific education lack the same degree of philosophical training, and they learn the materialistic metaphysics more by osmosis, than by being formally exposed to it, which would also teach its shortcomings.

From my own personal experience (I used to think like that too), you only get out of that through some sort of cathartic experience. You can't just reason your way out, because you tend to reason in those terms, like you're doing here. We call that an epistemic closure.

A simplification, but maybe it helps. Consider the classic dilemma, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound? Your answer probably would be that it does, because the tree will still disturb the air in the same way and produce the same waves in the atmosphere, regardless of anyone being there to hear, right? But disturbances in the air in the form of waves arent't sound! They are the quantifiable and measurable properties of the phenomena a conscious entity experiences and calls sound, but they are not sound itself. They are completely different things and there's a chasm between the two that can't be easily transposed.

In the same way, is an apple still red when nobody is watching? Again, you'd probably say yes, because regardless of anyone watching, the apple would still reflect light in the same wavelength, but again, color is one thing, photons of a particular wavelength being reflected are another entirely different thing.

At this point I guess you'd probably thinking of telling me that sound and color are just illusions, that they don't really exist, and guess what? I'd have to tell you again that this is precisely what thinking in terms of res extensae means. Maybe you'd ask me to give scientific evidence that they are not just illusions, but in order to provide scientific evidence, I have to reduce the phenomena to their quantifiable properties, and once I do that, it's obvious the phenomena we're really interested is outside the scope of science. Once someone begins to think that if something is outside the scope of science then it simply doesn't exist, that's what we call scientism.

Again, this is a simplification, but in a sense, the whole problem with QM is that you're expecting the tree to fall and make a sound also when no one is around to hear it, but that obviously doesn't make sense. When no one is around to hear, the sound only exists in terms of res extensa, in terms of its quantifiable properties, and QM already follows that. The dilemma isn't really a dilemma at all, because it's self-contradictory. Sound only exists when someone is around to hear it, color only exists when someone is watching it and forms only exist when someone is acknowledging them.

I realize they are from different realms, but would res extensae not imply without form?

Yes, but things don't exist separately like that in reality. Since forms only exist for an observer, they only exist within the res cogitans, but obviously, there's no such distinction in reality, because there's no knowledge without the cogniscent subject. That's just an abstraction we use since Descartes to make the examinations simpler.

When you say they don't have substantial (new addition here?) form, well, I accept that as so by definition, because I have to.

There are substantial and accidental forms, but in the context of this discussion, the distinction is irrelevant. I just used the term by reflex.

Ok, but I don't think you have given an answer to that yet.

I haven't given a direct answer to the 'why' because that's not possible within the limited scope of science, but I can answer that whatever it is, it's not different ontologicaly from the falling tree dilemma above.

Hmm. You are saying that for your philosophy, what the theory considers the collapse or transition from pure to mixed state is of no concern? So I can calculate the collapse whenever I think is late enough to still give correct results and you will not burn me at the stake? But the final act, the turning of a probability distribution into one of the possible realizations, that's the part where the substantial form comes in? Works, I guess.

I hate to be repetitive, but again, you're thinking of it solely in terms of res extensae. The probability distribution is just how you reduce the state into its quantifiable properties, it's not the state itself. It's not something I'm describing for "my" philosophy, it's the reality. An apple still falls from a tree in the same way, no matter how you are trying to predict its trajectory. The Schödinger's cat is dead or alive with a certain probability, he's not dead and alive at the same time.

I don't really see how that helps understand QM, but it may help those familiar with the material.

As I just said above, it does help understand QM because it's no longer treated as a different category of problems. To understand why the collapse happens is no more or less complicated than understanding that an apple only has color when someone is looking at it.

And yes, reality may be deterministic (and I'd say it probably is), but neither will we be able to prove it nor does it really matter.

For Science it doesn't matter, but for Philosophy it obviously does, since there can be no free-will if reality is deterministic. I just don't think of Science, Philosophy and Religion as separate and anthitetical things, but complementary methods to understand one thing we call reality.

None of the aether models that matched other observations (most prominently, Aberration) has Earth stationary relative to the Aether.

That argument just doesn't make sense. First of all, nobody at the time was interested in a model with an stationary Earth, they were trying to get rid of it, so the lack of models at the time isn't an argument against it.

Second, all the models back then needed to get Earth moving because observations have shown it wasn't, and they did that by assuming the ether had some additional property. If you remove that additional property, you're just fine back with an stationary Earth. From Bradley to Stokes and even Lorentz, you can do that with all of them.

Third, we're not talking about the late 19th or early 20th century. We're talking about the issue today, and modern geocentrists do have a valid model.

And yes, spacetime (or the EM-Field) is the new Aether. Perfectly well known. The observable difference?

You're splitting hairs. The particularities of each one are irrelevant to make my point that ultimately GR conceptualizes space as a medium, while the original premise was that no such medium existed.

What? When did that happen?

Ops... for some reason I said 'finite' when I actually meant 'constant'. My fault.

You gave zero alternative explanations.

Zero? What are we talking about then? In the very least, I gave you two. A newtonian universe with a stationary Earth, and a relativistic anisotropic universe with Lemaitre-Tolman-Bondi metrics and Earth in the center. This is not my original research, I'm not here presenting it to you. I'm just answering your questions to the better of my knowledge. If you have any genuine interest in the alternative explanations, the best approach is probably to go after them.

Again, where is the proof?

Where is the proof for Dark Matter? Where is the proof that redshifts are doppler effects? Where is the proof that Earth is moving? Where is the proof that physical dimensions are affected by movement? Where is the proof that time itself is affected by movement? Come on... if there was any conclusive prove to one model over the other, we wouldn't be having this conversation. You're just applying double standards, taking the convention you accept as proof. Frankly, if you were scrutinizing everything with the same dedication and requiring the same degree of proof you're requiring from me, you'd probably be at a loss.

What? How is it self-contradictory?

I never said it's self-contradictory. I said it can be used as a reductio ad absurdum. It's not quite the same thing. All self-contradictory arguments can be used as a reductio ad absurdum, but not all reductio ad absurdum arguments are self-contradictions. A valid reductio ad absurdum may also lead to ridiculous or implausible conclusions.

Where it bears on the conversation, the assumption that redshifts are velocity shifts leads to expansion, which demands curvature to keep isotropy, which ultimately demands 95% more mass than we actually observe, with the special condition that this mass and the energy propelling it are also undetectable directly. While that itself isn't absurd, it's quite implausible and ridiculous.

You should be familiar with the term "Hypothesis". That's what Dark Matter is.

And you should be familiar with the terms 'post hoc' and 'ad hoc'.

Come on... there's no reason to start patronizing each other at this point.

It's properties are conjectured, and then you work with that and calculate what results you get. Then you compare that to observations.

That's an idealization of a post hoc hypothesis. It's not the case with Dark Matter theory at all, since it was idealized to prevent other theories and assumptions from being falsified by those observations. When before formulating an hypothesis you already decided which results you won't accept when you test it, you're not doing science.

True, and they are welcome. Always look for better alternatives. But dismissing DM outright because... well, you haven't really given a compelling reason.

First, the fact that it can be used as a reductio ad absurdum argument should be compelling enough for anyone concerned more with logic than with preserving a dogma.

Second, I'm not dismissing it outright, and you already admitted that my skepticism is reasonable.

Third, whether a reason is compelling enough is something strictly personal. For me, the whole conundrum in 20th century astrophysics and cosmology that eventually lead to Dark Matter is more than compelling, even if it was a logically valid argument. Unfortunately, that's how science evolves.

Fair enough. But the parameter count/Occams Razor arguments from earlier still stand. Fewer free parameters are to be preferred.

If one can use that argument in here it's me, I don't do it because, as I already said, Occam's razor is a methodological heuristic. It increases the probability that you'll find a working solution sooner, but it says nothing regarding the truth of that solution.

Oooookay... with ether = spacetime?

Of course not, with ether as an absolute rest frame. There's no relative spacetime.

You can't do that and expect correct or even meaningful results. That's like, nah, worse than doing a calculations with complex numbers and just taking the real part.

Now you're just guessing. Not only I can do that and get correct and meaningful results, that's exactly how Thirring did it. In order to find a model for centrifugal and coriolis force, he decided to start from a model of an spheric hollow universe spinning with the Earth at the center, and see what forces would appear in a purely newtonian universe. When he did it, he realized, with surprise, that the centrifugal force does have an axial component.

As a matter of act, he realized that's what was missing in order to explain centrifugal force from a newtonian point of view: to consider the mass of the whole universe acting on the spinning object. That's why Newton couldn't explain centrifugal and coriolis force, because he always considered only isolated systems. It only appears when you add the mass of the universe revolving around, and it appears with an axial component. The conclusion is on page 721 of his paper. http://www.itp.kit.edu/~ertl/Hauptseminar/papers/lense-thierring-papers-translated.pdf

After realizing that, Thirring tried to fit the discovery in General Relativity, concluding that if the equator of the sphere is spinning faster, it has more relativistic mass and adds some pull towards it. Curiously, Thirring himself tries to explain the previous undetectability of this axial component by saying his model is certainly not physical, but obviously, that's precisely the model defended by geocentrists.

That would be the wrong direction and produce blueshift along the axis.

No, I just realized that since you presented this objection, you're thinking of redshifts as function of velocity, but that obviously can't be the case in an Earth-centered Newtonian universe.

Or rather, just like the centrifugal force, nothing at all because you are in a Newtonian universe.

But there's no centrifugal force in a Newtonian universe without the fix from Thirring I mentioned above, which involves having Earth in the center and the universe spinning around. How do you explain the radial pressure an object suffers in a centrifuge or the tug on a rope with a weight spinning on one end in a Newtonian system isolated from the universe? Since it was thought that General Relativity would fill all the gaps from newton's laws, Thirring himself thought he would find a relativistic explanation, and he did, but not realizing that to reach it, he also found a newtonian explanation in an Earth-centered universe. That's why I said Thirring inadvertently created a valid geocentric model.

Also a well known fact, yes. GR is constructed to allow any coordinate choice, stationary earth is one of them. Two problems: First, claiming this is a preferred coordinate system contradicts the intent of the theory

Contradicting the intent and contradicting the theory are very different thngs. I can contradict the intent of any theory as much as I want. If the author didn't realize the theory could also be used for something else than what he intended and even against it, well... too bad for him. Hopefully, he's already dead when that happens.

And now that you mention it, a rotating universe would also be a much more special initial condition than your standard big bang. That is a problem.

Not really. First of all, that's a problem at the cosmogonical level, and no matter how complicated the mechanics of the result are, they are completely irrelevant when you consider the problem of how the ontological change of nothing to something happens. It's like finding a monolyth on the Moon and argue about its composition, when the existence of the monolyth itself presents a much more complicated problem.

Second, since cosmogonical issues are beyond the scope of science, by their very nature, all arguments against the complexity of their initial conditions can be used against all of them. Big Bang itself was frowned upon by everyone who insisted on an infinite universe, until the choice Big Bang vs an Earth-centered universe became a dilemma. Under that, the cosmogonical issues that appear when you assume the universe had a beginning are much more acceptable than the metaphysical issues that appear when you assume Earth is in the center.

What I am saying here, bluntly, is that the claimed periodicity is not even a statistical blip or selection effect. It is a fundamental error in the analysis method.

I get it. I don't have the knowledge to object to that in good conscience, but I can see three conceptual problems with your argument. First, you say the big problem is that the data is not normalized against anything, but that's false, the data is normalized in many different ways in the three studies I mentioned, and that's even pointed as the source of the issue by some. Second, if the periodicity is an effect of the analysis method, why it doesn't also appear in studies that claim there's no periodicity but use the same method, like the Schneider et al. study? Third, that seems too fundamental to be overlooked by people who were looking for a solution to the problem for decades. If the problem is a fundamental error in the analysis method, I'd expect most studies to agree on the results, and then some study reveal that embarrassing error. That's not what happens. While there's disagreement on the normalization and filtering, there's no disagreement on the method. Can you point me to any study with the same conclusion you present here, that the whole issue for decades is just the result of bad statistics?

[ZetaX]

A simplification, but maybe it helps. Consider the classic dilemma, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound? Your answer probably would be that it does, because the tree will still disturb the air in the same way and produce the same waves in the atmosphere, regardless of anyone being there to hear, right? But disturbances in the air in the form of waves arent't sound! They are the quantifiable and measurable properties of the phenomena a conscious entity experiences and calls sound, but they are not sound itself. They are completely different things and there's a chasm between the two that can't be easily transposed.

That's simply wrong:

Sound is a vibration that propagates as a mechanical wave of pressure and displacement, through some medium (such as air or water).

Thus there is a sound.

Even if I replace "sound" by "the sensation of hearing a sound", your statement is contentless: the answer is trivially "no" as without anyone listening, this sense is not created by assumption.

Similar arguments work for your other examples.

[Z-Man]

Well... that's precisely what "thinking in terms of res extensae" means. Really, you nailed it. I think I couldn't come up with a more concise definition if I tried.

Well, yeah, but I acknowledge you think differently. Like I said earlier, it's just like different axioms. I can work with that. Or try. I'll still mix up terms, but I think we're getting closer. I obviously have to object to your claim that explaining QM purely in quantifiable terms is doomed to fail, by the way.

So. The falling tree. While I think you cheat your way out of this meditation exercise by defining the word "sound", hypothetical followup question. If a free falls in the forest, causes a pressure wave in the air, that pressure wave then triggers an avalanche, did the tree make a sound then? If not (which, I guess, is the case), what if the avalanche is seen by a wanderer on the other side of the valley (who did not hear the tree fall)?

Are you saying there is no difference between a QM system and a classical system at all? Neither one, if unobserved, fully exists, it just has matter, and only as it is observed, it gains form?

So that, in the end, QM is not really weird because the things we consider weird about it were there all along, we just did not see because we were stuck in the wrong thought model?

For Science it doesn't matter, but for Philosophy it obviously does, since there can be no free-will if reality is deterministic.

True, free will would evidently not exist as a first class object in a fully deterministic universe. But neither does non-determinism enforce free will, nor does determinism forbid free will as an effective theory of the mind. As long as it is impossible to actually predict your actions in the real world, where is the problem?

For the cosmology and stuff: Let's move that to a new thread. It does not belong here. First one to actually starts the new thread links to it from here. I'll do it, just not now. I also will not respond to everything you write, you spent so much time collecting your materials, addressing everything simply is not possible.

[ArmchairGravy]

Indeed.

Not necessarily. That conclusion is also a product of our cultural background, heavily influenced by the cartesian ontology of mind/body duality. If you follow my (long) explanation to Z-Man above, the whole point is precisely that you can simply replace those premises with others. If you replace them with the thomist ontology, then the mechanics of things at quantum scale are exactly the same of those at large scale.

Well... accepting the problem as part of reality doesn't really solve the problem. That's what Stephen Hawking proposes we do in his The Grand Design. Just give up, accept that reality itself is confusing, and use whatever incomplete model works for the moment. It doesn't really answer the question. When you reach that point, it's time to re-examine your premises.

+1.

This is not at all what Hawking was saying in The Grand Design. He said that instead of there being one GUT, instead we have model-dependent reality where different models can overlap. Our current models are very, very accurate in most cases. Where they break down is where we need new models. Quantum gravity is an example of a needed model. General Relativity is an example of a very, very accurate model. Newtonian physics is an example of a very, very accurate model that breaks down under extreme circumstances and required a new model (General Relativity) to augment it. I don't see this as giving up. I see this as using the right tool for the job at hand.

Edited February 13, 2014 by ArmchairGravy

[rkman]

For Science it doesn't matter, but for Philosophy it obviously does, since there can be no free-will if reality is deterministic. I just don't think of Science, Philosophy and Religion as separate and anthitetical things, but complementary methods to understand one thing we call reality.

Agreed, but with that, philosophy defines "free will" differently than the fuzzy definition that people use in the practice of every-day life.

So philosophically there is no "free will", but that means something different than what people usually mean by (lack of) "free will".

Edited February 13, 2014 by rkman

[ZetaX]

Last time I checked, it was essentially agreed upon that "free will" is a bad concept by itself and should be replaced by a perception of such freeness. I see no reason why this is wrong, so why not stay with that¿

[lodestar]

That's simply wrong:

Thus there is a sound.

Even if I replace "sound" by "the sensation of hearing a sound", your statement is contentless: the answer is trivially "no" as without anyone listening, this sense is not created by assumption.

Similar arguments work for your other examples.

Send that Wikipedia article to a person who was born deaf. Will that description fill all the gaps for him?

[lodestar]

Well, yeah, but I acknowledge you think differently. Like I said earlier, it's just like different axioms. I can work with that. Or try. I'll still mix up terms, but I think we're getting closer.

It's not just like different axioms, because the cartesian ontology doesn't end in reality, but in a flawed thought experiment made by Descartes. That's the root of the whole problem. If you attempt to trace the origin of your ideas, you'll eventually end up in the same place. We can talk about that in more detail if you want.

I obviously have to object to your claim that explaining QM purely in quantifiable terms is doomed to fail, by the way.

It's not a claim. That's not in dispute. Changes in quantity can't effect ontological change. You don't reach the subatomic world by just dividing the atomic world quantitatively. At some point, you effect some qualitative change.

So. The falling tree. While I think you cheat your way out of this meditation exercise by defining the word "sound", hypothetical followup question. If a free falls in the forest, causes a pressure wave in the air, that pressure wave then triggers an avalanche, did the tree make a sound then? If not (which, I guess, is the case), what if the avalanche is seen by a wanderer on the other side of the valley (who did not hear the tree fall)?

Actually, the cheaters are those who claim sound is nothing else but its quantifiable properties, since they are simply ignoring the binding problem.

Just think about this: how would you explain what sound is to someone who was born deaf? No matter how detailed and precise is your description of the quantifiable properties of the phenomenon, they simply never experienced the phenomenon itself. They may learn very well what the physical phenomena associated with sound are and what they can cause, they may even feel the vibration of a low frequency sound, they may even learn music theory and be able to read and write musical scores, but they just don't know what sound is.

Are you saying there is no difference between a QM system and a classical system at all? Neither one, if unobserved, fully exists, it just has matter, and only as it is observed, it gains form?

Not quite, but that's good enough.

So that, in the end, QM is not really weird because the things we consider weird about it were there all along, we just did not see because we were stuck in the wrong thought model?

Precisely.

True, free will would evidently not exist as a first class object in a fully deterministic universe. But neither does non-determinism enforce free will, nor does determinism forbid free will as an effective theory of the mind. As long as it is impossible to actually predict your actions in the real world, where is the problem?

For practical purposes, indeed, there's no problem, but then you're saying you're only concerned with utility, not truth. That's how science works, not philosophy.

For the cosmology and stuff: Let's move that to a new thread. It does not belong here.

Sure. Frankly, if you're genuinely interested, I think you should just read the book I mentioned, Sungenis' Galileo Was Wrong. That's my starting point on the subject, and since you know the physics much better than I do, you may even figure out some sensible objections on that aspect.

[lodestar]

This is not at all what Hawking was saying in The Grand Design. He said that instead of there being one GUT, instead we have model-dependent reality where different models can overlap. Our current models are very, very accurate in most cases. Where they break down is where we need new models. Quantum gravity is an example of a needed model. General Relativity is an example of a very, very accurate model. Newtonian physics is an example of a very, very accurate model that breaks down under extreme circumstances and required a new model (General Relativity) to augment it. I don't see this as giving up. I see this as using the right tool for the job at hand.

How is that different at all from what I'm saying? I'm saying the exact same thing, I'm just not using the same rhetorical tricks Hawking used.

Recommended reading: http://perennialphilosophyreadings.wordpress.com/2012/02/26/response-to-stephen-hawkings-physics-as-philosophy-by-wolfgang-smith/

Edited February 13, 2014 by lodestar

[ArmchairGravy]

"Well... accepting the problem as part of reality doesn't really solve the problem. That's what Stephen Hawking proposes we do in his The Grand Design. Just give up, accept that reality itself is confusing, and use whatever incomplete model works for the moment. It doesn't really answer the question. When you reach that point, it's time to re-examine your premises."

Um, this is the same thing as saying model-dependent reality works? It sounds to me like you have an issue with it, and are trying to pursue a GUT. Or perhaps you are uncomfortable that reality is messily uncertain, and demand that there is an objective, certain, absolute TRUTH underlying model-dependent reality we have yet to find, which seems to be the thrust of the article you recommended.

QCD works (the model makes predictions that are verified by observation). General Relativity works. Inflation theory works. Newtonian physics works. All these models are as disparate as can be. Insisting there must be something that ties them all together seems as naive to me as insisting that God doesn't play dice.

[lodestar]

Um, this is the same thing as saying model-dependent reality works?

Yes, it is.

It sounds to me like you have an issue with it, and are trying to pursue a GUT.

Not at all. I have an issue with presenting a metaphysics as physics, which is what Hawking does, and very poorly, by the way.

[ZetaX]

Send that Wikipedia article to a person who was born deaf. Will that description fill all the gaps for him?

a) quite a nonsequitur,

what gaps¿ I already said that you are mixing up sound with the perception of it, and the latter is _not_ in the realm of physics (but neurology/psychology/similar, depending on the aspect).

[lodestar]

a) quite a nonsequitur,

what gaps¿ I already said that you are mixing up sound with the perception of it, and the latter is _not_ in the realm of physics (but neurology/psychology/similar, depending on the aspect).

Man... do you realize how you're actually trying to answer the issue with the exact same problem it's trying to address? I'm saying the whole problem is in treating the mathematically reducible parts of a particular phenomenon as the phenomenon itself. Since they are a reduction, they are obviously not the entirety of the phenomenon, so it's obvious there's something left behind. You answer by again reducing the phenomenon to its quantifiable properties as if it were the entirety of it, without even realizing the tautology?

Reality isn't divided in realms. That's something we do, maybe in order to improve our knowledge within an specific scope, maybe to follow some bureaucratic division in academia, whatever. There's isn't one thing called 'sound' in physics and another thing called 'perception of sound' in neurology, or psychology. Sound is something we hear. Period. You can't describe what sound is to someone who never heard it, no matter how much you try, hence my example above. What you call 'sound' in physics are the quantifiable properties related to that phenomenon that can be described physically, but obviously you leave behind a lot of other properties not relevant to understand the phenomenon within the scope of physics. What you call 'sound' in neurology are the quantifiable properties related to that phenomenon that can be observed by instruments attached to our nervous system when we hear something, leaving aside a lot of other properties that can't be measured by the instruments, or not relevant to understand the phenomenon within the scope of neurology.

The way you try to answer the issue tautologically by restating the problem itself is what I called 'epistemic closure'. You're letting the process of closure that allows you to increase the grasp of the phenomenon by reducing it to a stripped down concept to define the phenomenon itself.