U.S. Space Force Discussion Thread

[DDE]

7 hours ago, insert_name said:

Yes, the two types of spacecraft, radar observation and space based weapons.

I do find the focus on radar fascinating, although I suspect it's a product of sensor limitations. Telling that the object isn't tumbling (is stabilized) and doesn't have major antennae sounds like the totality of what radar observations would yield.

[DDE]

Having taken a better look at the study, it's more of a fetish on "maneuver".

[DDE]

An interesting, if hawkish article. Belongs in this thread due to a pronounced viewpoint.

https://thespacereview.com/article/4336/1

[SunlitZelkova]

14 hours ago, DDE said:

An interesting, if hawkish article. Belongs in this thread due to a pronounced viewpoint.

https://thespacereview.com/article/4336/1

Regardless of its points on ASAT arms control as a whole, something like a Partial Anti-Satellite Test Ban Treaty (along the lines of nuclear test ban treaties), banning kinetic ASAT tests, would be in everyone's interest and be helpful.

On the other hand, the proposal for "norms" is pretty silly. Unless you announce in your Nuclear Posture Review you are going to respond to ASAT attacks with the use of low yield nuclear weapons (glances at Trident II with W76-2s), I can't see anyone agreeing to "norms" or taking them seriously.

I say this because unlike "smaller" conflicts, which international rules have supposedly been good at regulating conduct on, the only instance in which ASAT weapons will be used in anger is in a "great power conflict", and if the situation has deteriorated to a great power conflict, there will likely be no holds barred by one side or the other sooner or later.

In any case though, I wonder what these norms are intended to prevent outside of kinetic ASAT tests. Loitering? Close passes? These already happen on Earth completely unregulated when aircraft and/or ships intercept each other, so I fail to see how such things happening in space are so egregious. If anything, it should be even more acceptable in space, because unlike an aircraft breaching the restricted airspace around a carrier battle group, apart from the objects themselves, orbit belongs to "everyone", and thus can't be violated in any manner apart from an actual collision.

[SunlitZelkova]

In Space Force with Steve Carrell, there is a mural at the Space Force base in Colorado featuring astronauts raising the American flag on the Moon in a manner basically identical to that of the flag raising on Iwo Jima. This was likely meant as a comedic take on the militarization of space- humanity’s bloody battles but in (what was) an ostensibly peaceful locale. Astronauts with guns still feels very meme-like. The Space Force itself does have many meme-worthy elements.

Thus this was rather surprising to see-

I can’t help but see this with the same meaning the original has- one group triumphing over another. Hardly a good image of “cooperation”.

Now I want to see a cosmonaut raising the Roscosmos flag over Shackleton Crater in a manner similar to the famous Reichstag photo.

[DDE]

4 hours ago, SunlitZelkova said:

I can’t help but see this with the same meaning the original has- one group triumphing over another. Hardly a good image of “cooperation”.

Posted on April 12, no less.

[kerbiloid]

https://spacenews.com/space-force-briefing-on-military-space-race-catches-jeff-bezos-attention/

[SunlitZelkova]

https://x.com/planet4589/status/1734272637226856878?s=46&t=Jd73T2beq0JLNtwTy1uR5A
 

A little interesting tidbit- a GBI interceptor test conducted two days ago was against an IRBM class target dropped from a C-17. This was probably intended to test the ability to detect and intercept air launched ballistic missiles, given China has now put them into limited service.

[kerbiloid]

They should test the airship missile launch first.

[DDE]

On 4/13/2022 at 6:15 AM, SunlitZelkova said:

The Space Force itself does have many meme-worthy elements.

https://spacenews.com/space-force-inks-deal-with-microsoft-for-mixed-reality-training/

AFAIK Microsoft was divesting from AR...

[StrandedonEarth]

Galactic Defender in the background, lol

[JoeSchmuckatelli]

On 1/14/2024 at 10:15 AM, StrandedonEarth said:

Galactic Defender in the background, lol

They gotta have somewhere to train.

[SunlitZelkova]

I saw an interesting article about space-based missile defense. Because it includes some political stuff, I'm just copying over the engineering parts.

Quote

But previous efforts to field a space-based missile interceptor system did not move forward in large part because the technology was immature, and the costs were prohibitive. But times have changed. This article provides an updated rough order of magnitude estimate for what such a system might cost. The analysis is based on the methodology outlined in a 2004 report by the American Physical Society (APS) and is updated with current assumptions.

Intercepting a missile during the boost phase is ideal because the missile cannot deploy decoy warheads and is much easier to track. It is challenging, however, because of the tight timeline involved. An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) typically has a boost phase that lasts three to four minutes, and it may take 30 seconds or more before a launch is detected and a track is established. Even with the improved coverage of the new missile tracking layer being deployed by the Space Force in the coming years, it is reasonable to assume that a space-based interceptor would have roughly 150 seconds to strike its target during the boost phase.

To be effective, interceptors would need to be based in low Earth orbit (LEO) to intercept the missile inflight. Using the aforementioned APS model, if the interceptors are kept in orbit at an altitude of 500 km, approximately 1,900 interceptors would be needed to provide continuous coverage of all points on Earth with an average of two interceptors. Each interceptor, including propellant, kill vehicle, and support systems, would weigh around 900 kg. Using an 85 percent learning curve, the average procurement unit cost (APUC) of each interceptor in a constellation like this is estimated to be between $4.4 and $8.9 million, for a total procurement cost of $8.6 to $17.2 billion (all costs are in 2025 dollars). An additional $2 to $4 billion would likely be needed for non-recurring development costs, and the constellation would need to be replenished about every 5 years as satellites age and their orbits decay.

Launch costs are perhaps the area where updated assumptions matter the most because launch costs have fallen significantly in the past decade and are expected to fall by another factor of ten in the coming years. At the low end (using the most generous assumptions) launching a constellation of 1,900 interceptors with a mass of 900 kg each would require at least 12 of SpaceX’s Starship launch vehicle with a payload capacity of 150,000 kg each and an estimated cost of $70 million per launch (an aggressive assumption). At the high end, it would require 39 of Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket with a payload capacity of 45,000 kg and a cost of up to $150 million per launch. Given these assumptions, the overall launch cost would be somewhere between $0.8 to $5.9 billion for the constellation. As in the case of the interceptors, launch costs would be incurred each time the constellation needs to be replenished every five years or so.

The total cost to develop, build, and launch an initial constellation of 1,900 space-based interceptors would likely be on the order of $11 to $27 billion. If this seems like a no-brainer to [snip], there’s a catch. The system described above is only sized to intercept a maximum of two missiles launched in a salvo. That means that if an adversary launches a salvo of three missiles, only two could be intercepted and at least one would get through because all of the other interceptors in the constellation would be out of range—what is known as the absenteeism problem.

The grim reality is that the cost of a space-based interceptor system scales linearly with the number of missiles it can intercept in a salvo, excluding development costs. Designing the system to have an average of four interceptors in range (and thus able to intercept a salvo of four missiles at once) requires twice as many interceptors (some 3,800 in total) and twice as many launches. This is true even if multiple interceptors are housed together. A space-based interceptor system for missile defense does not scale well when compared to adversary missile forces. While the costs have come down and the technology has matured, the physics of space-based interceptors has not changed.

That 2004 report also has some content that kinda pushes the boundaries of the forum rules, but if you're interested, just Google "Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues," and it pops up.

So looking at the numbers here, USSF would have 780 ICBMs to intercept from... the other two big guys (326 + 454)... by roughly 2035 or so. That would require 741,000 satellites, and it requires the assumption that every single interceptor will work perfectly, because there are no backups.

Curiously, that five-year lifespan is the same as a Starlink sat. But Starlink is planned to have 42,000 satellites at most.

With... let's just say, the smaller guy... some estimates put the number of ICBMs he might build at maximum at roughly 60 or 100. Of course, who knows, he might build more. But if that is the maximum capacity he has, 95,000 satellites would be required at maximum, and 57,000 at minimum. That's actually not that bad at all, and might be doable. Still, it requires every satellite working perfectly. No "volleys" or "salvos."

Ignoring the political aspects of the system, I'm very interested to see how advocates for this are going to approach the engineering and economical challenges.

If it doesn't work out I'm hoping that "Iron Colander" catches on as a nickname for the system like "Star Wars" did for SDI 

[DDE]

On 2/22/2025 at 2:53 AM, SunlitZelkova said:

So looking at the numbers here, USSF would have 780 ICBMs to intercept from... the other two big guys (326 + 454)... by roughly 2035 or so. That would require 741,000 satellites, and it requires the assumption that every single interceptor will work perfectly, because there are no backups.

This number would be subject to extreme variance. On the one hand, arms control experts from the Bigger of Two Guys assume the system, like its predecessor, will be scaled to counter not all ICBMs but those that survive an opening disarming barrage (that such a system encourages firing nukes first is one of the many, many reasons why they don't like such systems). On the other hand, it also assumes the adversary will stay put and not attempt to use penetration aids... which is already a false assumption. In fact, penetration aids for the exoatmospheric portion of flight are much easier to build (inflatables) then the "heavy" decoys used in terminal flight.

Spoiler

Mid-stage inflatable decoy for Bulava

Example SRBM heavy decoys

...and their effectiveness is an absolute unknown, GBI has only been tested against unprotected targets. This is the reason why mid-stage missile defenses were largely reliant on gold-tampered megaton-range warheads to "clear the threat pipe", and modern MIRVs put an end even to that.

And that's just the current state of the art. Significant research was conducted into SDI counters. One of them was "MIRVing" the second and third stages so that the missile is already split up by the time it exits atmosphere and enters the range of giant space lasers. The more radical ones... well, I guess everyone saw those in 2018.

[DDE]

https://www.twz.com/land/trumps-missile-defense-initiatives-name-changed-from-iron-dome-to-golden-dome

LOL

[SunlitZelkova]

One thing I can see the whole space-based BMD thing being used for is to just get regulations out of the way to enable SpaceX's rapid reuse plans. If SpaceX says they can build the interceptor sat (lol at the idea of them building weapons) and they will need rapid reuse to build the constellation, it looks like the Missile Defense Agency will push for the abolition or rewriting of any regulations that contribute to long times between launches.

Even if the space-based BMD winds up being cancelled (which it probably will), SpaceX will have cleared regulatory obstacles to rapid reuse of Starship. Leaving them more ready to do their whole "1,000 ships to Mars every transfer window to build a city on Mars" thing (which I have noted is just as preposterous as space-based BMD in a post in another thread).

 

[Nuke]

On 2/21/2025 at 2:53 PM, SunlitZelkova said:

I saw an interesting article about space-based missile defense. Because it includes some political stuff, I'm just copying over the engineering parts.

That 2004 report also has some content that kinda pushes the boundaries of the forum rules, but if you're interested, just Google "Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues," and it pops up.

So looking at the numbers here, USSF would have 780 ICBMs to intercept from... the other two big guys (326 + 454)... by roughly 2035 or so. That would require 741,000 satellites, and it requires the assumption that every single interceptor will work perfectly, because there are no backups.

Curiously, that five-year lifespan is the same as a Starlink sat. But Starlink is planned to have 42,000 satellites at most.

With... let's just say, the smaller guy... some estimates put the number of ICBMs he might build at maximum at roughly 60 or 100. Of course, who knows, he might build more. But if that is the maximum capacity he has, 95,000 satellites would be required at maximum, and 57,000 at minimum. That's actually not that bad at all, and might be doable. Still, it requires every satellite working perfectly. No "volleys" or "salvos."

Ignoring the political aspects of the system, I'm very interested to see how advocates for this are going to approach the engineering and economical challenges.

If it doesn't work out I'm hoping that "Iron Colander" catches on as a nickname for the system like "Star Wars" did for SDI 

i think it all comes down to whats cheaper to build? warheads or interceptors? given that warheads can share launch vehicles i think its less. but warheads are not cheap either. of course what happens ultimately is that interceptors are placed to protect centers of government and other high value locations, with the rest of the population centers being considered acceptable losses (and also prime targets). a nuclear war will be a contest to cripple the other side's economy to a point where being a nuclear power is no longer a sustainable option. i dont think nucelar war is the world-ender it was in the early '80s, but its still going to suck for everyone involved and several that arent (and when those invade to retaliate for being irradiated, the heads go too).

Edited February 27 by Nuke

[SunlitZelkova]

11 minutes ago, Nuke said:

i think it all comes down to whats cheaper to build? warheads or interceptors? given that warheads can share launch vehicles i think its less. but warheads are not cheap either. of course what happens ultimately is that interceptors are placed to protect centers of government and other high value locations, with the rest of the population centers being considered acceptable losses (and also prime targets). a nuclear war will be a contest to cripple the other side's economy to a point where being a nuclear power is no longer a sustainable option. i dont think nucelar war is the world-ender it was in the early '80s, but its still going to suck for everyone involved and several that arent (and when those invade to retaliate for being irradiated, the heads go too).

Space-based interceptors can't be assigned to protect certain targets. They attack missiles during their boost-phase, at a point in their flight before it is possible to ascertain what the target might be.

The sucky thing about missile defense from the USSF's point of view is that The Other Two Big Guys, as I have called them, might have a much easier time building new missiles because they have expansive wilderness to base mobile ICBMs nearby. They thus can bypass the hard limitations that prevent anyone from building more silos than they already have. In contrast, the US just doesn't have that kind of environment. A mobile basing option was examined for MX (Peacekeeper) but it would have required buying an enormous amount of land near the Rockies and building race tracks that the missiles would drive around on, because both due to Opsec and terrain reasons it wasn't feasible to just let them go out into the wilderness. Of course, if the Canadian tundra was readily available to the US military...

The economics don't work out in favor for the interceptors, especially if they have to be replaced every five years. A missile might be kept in service for much longer, IIRC some R-36 variants entered service in the mid 70s and didn't get retired until the 90s or early 2000s. But even if the number of interceptors could match the missiles, there are still a number of counters to interceptors as @DDE mentioned. One notable example is Skif-DM (Polyus), the payload carried by the first Energia. It had a laser specifically for destroying space-based interceptors:

Spoiler

A variant with kinetic interceptors was also proposed:

I must say this whole thing fascinates me though. There was a book in my classroom library in 4th grade, and among other 2000s-quality CGI-generated images in it that amazed me like a Progress smashing into the ISS (captioned "Nightmare on the ISS") there was a manned space-based laser platform shown firing at a wave of ICBMs. I never dreamed that sort of thing would actually be on the table for discussion some day and when I found a DefenseOne article from 2021 indicating the MDA wanted to look into a space-based BMD test, I actually thought it was fake news because I thought people knew space-based BMD was an impossibility.

Based on reporting about the new initiative, that 2021 request was indeed real. Together with the debut of a certain Hazel Tree, it's like living in the 80s lol.

[Nuke]

1 hour ago, SunlitZelkova said:

Space-based interceptors can't be assigned to protect certain targets. They attack missiles during their boost-phase, at a point in their flight before it is possible to ascertain what the target might be.

The sucky thing about missile defense from the USSF's point of view is that The Other Two Big Guys, as I have called them, might have a much easier time building new missiles because they have expansive wilderness to base mobile ICBMs nearby. They thus can bypass the hard limitations that prevent anyone from building more silos than they already have. In contrast, the US just doesn't have that kind of environment. A mobile basing option was examined for MX (Peacekeeper) but it would have required buying an enormous amount of land near the Rockies and building race tracks that the missiles would drive around on, because both due to Opsec and terrain reasons it wasn't feasible to just let them go out into the wilderness. Of course, if the Canadian tundra was readily available to the US military...

The economics don't work out in favor for the interceptors, especially if they have to be replaced every five years. A missile might be kept in service for much longer, IIRC some R-36 variants entered service in the mid 70s and didn't get retired until the 90s or early 2000s. But even if the number of interceptors could match the missiles, there are still a number of counters to interceptors as @DDE mentioned. One notable example is Skif-DM (Polyus), the payload carried by the first Energia. It had a laser specifically for destroying space-based interceptors:

  Reveal hidden contents

A variant with kinetic interceptors was also proposed:

I must say this whole thing fascinates me though. There was a book in my classroom library in 4th grade, and among other 2000s-quality CGI-generated images in it that amazed me like a Progress smashing into the ISS (captioned "Nightmare on the ISS") there was a manned space-based laser platform shown firing at a wave of ICBMs. I never dreamed that sort of thing would actually be on the table for discussion some day and when I found a DefenseOne article from 2021 indicating the MDA wanted to look into a space-based BMD test, I actually thought it was fake news because I thought people knew space-based BMD was an impossibility.

Based on reporting about the new initiative, that 2021 request was indeed real. Together with the debut of a certain Hazel Tree, it's like living in the 80s lol.

sometimes i wonder if the icbm is becoming obsolete as a first strike option. the primary advantage of icbms was to surpass the limitations of long range strategic bombers available at the time. but now we have stealth, midair refueling, hypersonic, and drone tech. we also have submarines that can park off the cost of a target and unload with little warning and mere seconds of reaction time. russia's nuclear drone torpedoes are definitely out of the box thinking. spec ops deployments are also an option. a first strike is never going to happen in the way we expect it to happen.

Edited February 27 by Nuke

[DDE]

8 hours ago, SunlitZelkova said:

The sucky thing about missile defense from the USSF's point of view is that The Other Two Big Guys, as I have called them, might have a much easier time building new missiles because they have expansive wilderness to base mobile ICBMs nearby. They thus can bypass the hard limitations that prevent anyone from building more silos than they already have.

There's been significant marketing pitch with regards of "left of launch BMD" that involves an aerial campaign to hunt the mobile ICBMs (ПГРК) that may further muddy the water in terms of balance. I think the real reason US ICBM projects were duds is that the US tried to make them have comparable resilience to silos. I mean, look at this

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ed/Small_ICBM_Hard_Mobile_Launcher_USAF.jpg/1600px-Small_ICBM_Hard_Mobile_Launcher_USAF.jpg

and then at this

https://cdn.tvc.ru/pictures/o/224/272.jpg

Because of that, the difference between mobile launchers and silos is that the silo requires a direct hit on a fixed target, whilst an entire battery of mobile launchers can be taken out by a lucky tacnuke. Terminal BMD is possible to arrange for a silo, but it becomes a dangerous tell for a battery on the move.

Hence why Yars regiments get Peresvet ground-to-space lasers, it seems.

7 hours ago, Nuke said:

we also have submarines that can park off the cost of a target and unload with little warning and mere seconds of reaction time

Submarines used to be considered a substandard first strike option because of lower accuracy. This seems to have abated. Furthermore, while at the height of the First Cold War parking boomers off an enemy's coast was implausible. Now, though... yeah. And I don't just mean the Russian shadow of a navy.

7 hours ago, Nuke said:

russia's nuclear drone torpedoes are definitely out of the box thinking.

It's really a third-strike weapon. It can sink some boomers in harbor, but US boomers have a decent readiness rate, and so about half of them won't be in a harbor to begin with.

[SunlitZelkova]

We're only a few weeks into Star Wars 2: Electric Boogaloo and Lockheed Martin has already begun pitching ideas. No link because some language they use on their website crosses forum lines.

The key points (emphasis mine):

• Begin delivering the first elements of Golden Dome by the end of next year (!!!).
• Build a National Team to develop Golden Dome, led by Lockheed Martin (lololololololo).
• Build off the existing BMD network whose software and many elements are currently entirely built by teams led by or involving Lockheed Martin, rather than starting from scratch.

Looking at point 1: This isn't actually that silly because Golden Dome is supposed to encompass cruise missile defense too, which would come in the form of the PAC-3 MSE missile built by LM. On the space front though... color me skeptical. I doubt they actually were talking about space-based assets in relation to this goal.

Looking at point 2: It sounds really really dumb given the HLS debacle, but LM rightly points out that Golden Dome is a Manhattan Project-scale endeavour (they do not point out, but it is obvious to myself that a continent-wide BMD network is very different than a lunar lander). Lockheed going for leadership is not that big of an alarm bell either. They already do a myriad of BMD-related work. In contrast, Boeing plays a limited role* in systems developed jointly with LM and other contractors, while SpaceX has no experience designing weapons whatsoever.

Looking at point 3: This is a no-brainer given the types of targets involved. It's another reason in favor of LM having a big role in the project.

Lockheed does not name anyone to the National Team; despite the same name it is not identical to the HLS National Team. Thus theoretically SpaceX could be involved in this new National Team.

I could see SpaceX building the bus for the space-based interceptor using Starlink, and SpaceX and BO jointly sharing a big portion of launch responsibility for the constellation (this goes for tracking sats too). This would involve BO getting nitty gritty details about some technical aspects of Starlink though.

For sure all traditional space contractors are going to be involved in this but it will be interesting to see the role commercial providers play. Honestly I can't see a 50-60,000 satellite constellation being built without SpaceX. I would assume this would involve building new factories given the sensitive nature of the weapon compared to the civilian Starlink sat, as well as Starlink having its own priority due to its potential use in military communications.

*Boeing does notably lead the team for the GMD ground-based interceptors. If statistics are deliberately skewed, the system has a 97% target destruction probability with a salvo of four missiles, but realistically each interceptor has something more on the order of a 25%-50% hit probability every time regardless of how many are launched at one target. Take that for what you will about Boeing's qualifications for the job.

[DDE]

13 hours ago, SunlitZelkova said:

Looking at point 3: This is a no-brainer

...assuming they've locked into a mid-course intercept concept, which for reasons outlined above is a giant hurdle of hunting down MIRVs in a cloud of decoys

The real threat would have been a Golden Dome that's focused on boost-phase intercept, or "left of launch" missile defense (space-to-ground strike). In this configuration, it would be made of Swiss cheese.

13 hours ago, SunlitZelkova said:

Begin delivering the first elements of Golden Dome by the end of next year

From the marketing team that's brought the world a "comprehensive" system of fighter generations...

[SunlitZelkova]

1 hour ago, DDE said:

...assuming they've locked into a mid-course intercept concept, which for reasons outlined above is a giant hurdle of hunting down MIRVs in a cloud of decoys

Funny you should mention that…

That’s NGI, the replacement for GMD. Built by Lockheed Martin (surprise surprise) and deployed in the same silos as GMD.

Space-based takes out most of the stuff and NGI gets what survives… I guess?

I wish the MDA would make some good graphics detailing how Golden Dome is supposed to work, like the Japanese MOD does.

(It’s even an apolitical graphic lol. I don’t recall any tiny islands with ballistic missiles)

1 hour ago, DDE said:

The real threat would have been a Golden Dome that's focused on boost-phase intercept, or "left of launch" missile defense (space-to-ground strike). In this configuration, it would be made of Swiss cheese.

Space-based is in theory supposed to be a big part of it but not the piece-de-resistance. For one reason or another (VLS-equipped SSNs or Burevestnik) cruise missiles are believed to be a big threat too. Believed to be. Whether they really are or not is a question. Comparing the actual size of the Long-Range Aviation in 1954-1964 with the scale of threats that stuff like the DEW Line was built to defend against I shall remain skeptical.

My understanding of left-of-launch is that it is focused on “the smaller guy” but… according to a well read (if very partial) guy on Bluesky who enjoys pouring through DOD and Congressional documents, the B-21 is explicitly intended to play the TEL-hunting role the B-2 was proposed to serve in. This is supposedly only in relation to hunting conventional SRBM TELs only, but realistically there are so many dual-capable missiles out there that whether intentionally or unintentionally an anti-nuclear left-of-launch capability will wind up being available as a complement to Golden Dome.

I’ve never understood how aircraft-based left-of-launch was supposed to work in the nuclear context. Unless an extraordinary scale of time-on-target strikes can be achieved simultaneously, it seems like the moment one battery of TELs gets taken out the cat will be out of the bag and everything else will launch.

And then there’s the problem of making sure an actual TEL is being hit. The PLARF has an entire institute dedicated to camouflage and decoys because mass deception is an integral part of their doctrine.

Edited Wednesday at 09:03 AM by SunlitZelkova

[DDE]

23 hours ago, SunlitZelkova said:

I wish the MDA would make some good graphics detailing how Golden Dome is supposed to work

That requires them to know how it's supposed to work. I don't think they've nailed that down yet.

23 hours ago, SunlitZelkova said:

I’ve never understood how aircraft-based left-of-launch was supposed to work in the nuclear context. Unless an extraordinary scale of time-on-target strikes can be achieved simultaneously, it seems like the moment one battery of TELs gets taken out the cat will be out of the bag and everything else will launch.

This is speculative, because it sounds pretty mad, but there may be a belief that they can boil the frog. First poke some strikes at something nuclear-adjacent like an early warning radar, which doesn't merit full MAD. Then maybe take out a bomber, which is a dual-capable asset. Then slowly start hunting ICBM TELs, which are about just as valuable. Each step individually would not merit a strategic counterstrike but combined they might be sufficiently degrading.

The [unmentionable country without nuclear weapons] has already done/credibly attempted 2 out of 3 steps above, and it's still not nuked.

This may be the result of the US not really believing in MAD. There's a distinct desire to have tailored responses to every situation, often situations that are rather fanciful - e.g. W76-2 being meant to match "nuclear blackmail". Accordingly, I feel the US doctrinists don't believe (professionally/on paper) in just flipping out and "letting the cat out of the bag", and project the same thinking onto their adversaries.

This is a horrific flaw, both when dealing with a weaker adversary and when dealing with a real POTUS. If a hypothetical Northerner Korea nuked a US city, would a hypothetical US president, like, say...

Spoiler

not yet the Illusive Man

...ask for a proportionate counterresponse to force Northerner Korea to the negotiating table, or would they declare Exterminatus?

Edited Thursday at 08:25 AM by DDE